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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCM	Christian Council of Mozambique
CEEI	<i>Centro de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais</i>
CND	<i>Comissão Nacional de Desminagem</i>
COPRECAL	<i>Comissão para a Prevenção e Controle de Armas Ligeiras</i>
FADM	<i>Forces armas de Mocambique</i>
FRELIMO	<i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique.</i>
COM	Government of Mozambique
GPA	General Peace Agreement
IND	<i>Instituto Nacional de Desminagem</i>
ISRI	<i>Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais</i>
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PRM	<i>Polícia da Republica de Moçambique</i>
RENAMO	<i>Resistência Nacional de Moçambique</i>
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SAPS	South African Police Service
TAE	<i>Transformação das Armas em Enxadas (Tools for Arms)</i>
UN	United Nations
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Mozambique, still considered one of the poorest countries in the world, is at the forefront of the movement aiming to curb the availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the Southern African region. In August 2001 Mozambique signed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials, aimed at preventing and controlling through regional mechanisms the illicit trade of SALW in the region, and ratified its commitment in September 2002.

This regional commitment is part of a continuum of efforts to disarm Mozambican society. When Mozambique signed the SADC Protocol, there were two very successful disarmament initiatives already ongoing in the country—the government-led Operation Rachel and the civil society-led project TAE, trading tools for firearms.

This monograph tries to provide an overview of the several approaches to disarmament in Mozambique and analyse the different steps required for the implementation of the SADC Protocol—where there is complementarity, where there is duplication of efforts, what is in place and what has to be put in place.

This study of Mozambique forms part of a larger research project being undertaken in several countries in Southern Africa to identify the challenges facing countries as they undertake to implement regional and international commitments on small arms. The Institute for Security Studies is supporting these research efforts, which are being coordinated by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (South Africa) and Gun-free South Africa.

The introduction looks at the historical determinants for the proliferation of SALW in the region, and in particular in Mozambique, giving a brief account of the several conflicts that plagued the country for the past 30 years. It also presents the methodology used for this monograph and the constraints this approach posed.

Chapter 1 analyses the three different approaches to disarmament in Mozambique in terms of their legacies to the country. ONUMOZ, the UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique, was the first approach to disarmament in Mozambique. This chapter looks at the constraints and at the political choices of the time and at the impact those choices had on the security situation in Mozambique. This is followed by a brief analysis of the two ongoing disarmament programmes—Operation Rachel and the Christian Council of Mozambique’s project TAE—Tools for Arms.

Chapter 2 argues that disarmament is but an element of the broader concern of human security. As such, disarmament initiatives should not be isolated from the operation of the overall security sector. This chapter looks at several of the security sector institutions, such as police and armed forces, their legacies, their problems, their needs, and how they can contribute to the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Firearms, which will be overseen by a multi-institutional committee on small arms (*COPRECAL*).

Chapter 3 looks at the opportunities and challenges facing Mozambique in the implementation of the SADC Firearms Protocol, as well as the challenges facing in the country in sustaining its efforts to reduce the availability and use of small arms.

Chapter 4 presents the findings of a survey carried out in Chimoio (northern Mozambique) on the impact of SALW in the communities. Annex 1 contains the survey questionnaire. The concluding section of the monograph presents some of the opportunities in Mozambique to continue its efforts to reduce weapons availability and implement regional agreements on managing small arms.

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War attention was focused on weapons of mass destruction, which were perceived as presenting the greatest threat to human security.¹ Whereas global balance was being achieved based on these super-weapons, regionally and nationally a different picture was taking shape on the African continent.

The hegemonic tendencies of both superpowers, the USA (United States of America) and the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), provided support to military and/or authoritarian regimes perceived as friendly, with disregard for the fragility or sustainability of such regimes. In most instances, this support was translated into the unregulated provision of small arms and light weapons (SALW) to these regimes, or to those daring to challenge them.

The Cold War was thus able to create relative (albeit artificial and oppressive) stability in parts of Africa, a region favoured by both superpowers for the Cold War game. Such stability was to crumble together with the Berlin Wall in 1989. The façade of the Cold War world and of its relative stability left Africa awash with SALW and well established traders and routes for their traffic.

Without the external support of superpowers, governments perceived as corrupt, oppressive and with little legitimacy could now be openly challenged. The proliferation of SALW, trafficking routes and traders turned armed insurgency into a feasible option, as opposed to more time consuming political alternatives, while widespread poverty created the recruitment pools insurgencies needed.² Mozambique was not immune to this regional dynamic in Africa, which was compounded by the specific historical determinants of the country—the struggle for independence from 1964 to 1974 and the subsequent 14 years of civil war.³ As in other Portuguese colonies, independence in Mozambique was achieved by an armed struggle, in the case of Mozambique led by Frelimo, *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*.

Frelimo resulted from the merger of nationalist movements, whose binding thread was the fight against colonialism. Created as an umbrella organization

Frelimo evolved into a cohesive nationalist movement with a clear Marxist ideology, striving for the creation of a classless society in Mozambique. After independence in 1975 until the mid-1980s Frelimo constituted itself as a political party, imposed a single party system, and adopted a Marxist economic approach. The dissatisfaction and dissent created by the impact of these measures on traditional social structures and on the expectations of some sectors of the society not only prevented the emergence of national unity, but also created the necessary recruitment pools that hostile regional powers (Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa) needed to interfere in the nation building process. From these recruitment pools, supported by regimes hostile to Mozambique, emerged Renamo, *Resistência Nacional de Moçambique*. Soon after independence,⁴ Renamo's armed incursions started to disrupt rural life in Mozambique and ultimately led to a civil war justified, *inter alia*, along ethnic lines, which are still used today to canvass and define political loyalties.

The civil war in Mozambique came to an end with the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992, followed by a United Nations-led peace process supported by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ until the end of 1994.⁵ After the withdrawal of ONUMOZ, increases in crime, particularly armed crime, made it obvious that SALW were not only still prevalent in Mozambique but also leaking into neighbouring countries, above all South Africa.⁶

In 1995, merely one year after the withdrawal of the ONUMOZ mission, the proliferation of SALW and the problems they caused in both countries led the governments of Mozambique and South Africa to join efforts and implement a disarmament initiative: Operation Rachel. This government-backed programme was complemented in Mozambique by ongoing civil society initiatives, namely the Arms for Tools project (TAE) sponsored by the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM).

In August 2001 Mozambique signed the SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials, aimed at preventing and controlling through regional mechanisms the illicit trade of arms and light weapons in the region. In September 2002, parliament ratified the Protocol and the government of Mozambique (GoM) began to take steps towards its implementation. In spite of the troubled history of the country, Mozambique is now at the forefront of regional efforts to control and prevent the proliferation of SALW.

However, the implementation of international agreements often poses unforeseen problems to national governments: some institutions may have to be created, while others need to be developed; priorities differ from country to country and the need for the allocation of resources to other sectors may be deemed more important.

The government of Mozambique is establishing a multi-institutional body – COPRECAL (*Comissão para a Prevenção e Controlo de Armas Ligeiras*) – to supervise and co-ordinate the implementation of the SADC Protocol. The role and scope of COPRECAL will be discussed in depth later in this monograph.

Given the history of SALW control efforts in Mozambique and the recent impetus provided by ratifying the SADC Protocol, as well as adopting the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, it was apparent that research to assess the current situation in Mozambique regarding the different approaches to controlling SALW proliferation and the constraints that the implementation of the SADC Protocol may have to face would be valuable. This is what the research team set out to achieve.

This monograph is based on fieldwork carried out in Mozambique from November 2002 to September 2003. The research consists mainly of interviews with officers in the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, customs and excise, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), journalists, academics, and Mozambican citizens. The field research was concluded with a two-day workshop, which included representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Defence, and Foreign Affairs, the armed forces, the Presidency, academic institutions and civil society organizations. The field work was complemented by extensive documentary research. Finally, the research team conducted a survey in Chimoio (central Mozambique) on the impact of SALW at the community level. The findings of this survey constitute a chapter of this monograph.

Although the focus of the research was on the approaches to disarmament and steps taken by the Mozambican government towards the implementation of the SADC Protocol on small arms and light weapons, it became clear very soon that the prevention and control of SALW should be viewed within the wider context of the security sector. For example, one official from the Ministry of Interior remarked: “What is the point of investing so many resources in weapons destruction if we are unable to efficiently patrol our

coastline? ”⁷ The same feeling is expressed by Mosse and Nyararai in an article called “Mozambique: a powder keg”, published in June 2003:

“... The authorities do not know who owns what arms, or how they get access to them. The government does not even know the quantity of arms used by the uniformed forces. If the government cannot control the movement and use of small arms within its jurisdiction, clearly it cannot control the illicit proliferation and misuse of small arms in the country.”⁸

It has become clear that the successful implementation of the SADC Protocol needs to bring together several governmental institutions, which are currently at different stages of institutional development and receiving varying support from donors.

Thus, the parameters of this monograph were broadened in order to accommodate an analysis of the different institutions that could be active in SALW control efforts, of the ways they can contribute towards the common goal of preventing and controlling SALW and of the different problems they face.

During the survey conducted in Chimoio, it was obvious that although SALW research in Mozambique is possible and even welcome, questions related specifically to SALW raised discomfort among respondents. People in government institutions did not react differently – whereas officials would openly discuss problems plaguing their institutions in particular and the social and political environment in Mozambique in general, questions relating specifically to quantitative data on legal SALW, such as numbers and composition of current stockpiles, were met with some resistance and suspicion. This is not to say that government officials were obstructive; on the contrary the research team felt tremendously supported inside these institutions and has only gratitude for those interviewed. They were open and candid in their statements, had a strong grasp of the issues being discussed, and were available in spite of all the concurrent initiatives in Maputo at the time.

However questions regarding quantitative data are still perceived as intrusions in matters of national security and national sovereignty. In the same way that some donors appear wary of supporting the security sector, which is considered too political, so national governments seem to perceive a threat when disclosing security-related information. Nevertheless, given the tremendous impact that the security sector has on the development of post-conflict societies, both donors and national governments should consider a

serious shift in perspective when addressing this issue. This will be discussed with more detail later in the monograph.

Given the sensitivity of the issues discussed, the research team has not named the people who so generously offered their time and information.

Notes

1. Margaret O'Grady, *Small Arms and Africa*, <<http://www.caat.org.uk/information/publications/countries/africa-0909.php>> (May 2003).
2. The link between poor governance, poverty and militarization has been explored by Angela McIntyre in several ISS publications.
3. For a more detailed explanation of the impact of both conflicts on arms proliferation in Mozambique see articles and reports written, amongst others by Anícia Lalá, Martinho Chachia, and Alex Vines.
4. Different authors attribute different dates for Renamo's incursions: some mention 1976 while others consider 1978. Here we use 1978 as a reference date, since it was from 1978 on that Renamo's incursions took the systematized character of a civil war.
5. The English acronym for the mission is UNOMOZ, however, it is the Portuguese acronym ONUMOZ that is mostly used.
6. N Stott, "*Operation Rachel: Lesson drawing and the potential for a regional (SADC) initiative*", ISS, forthcoming. However, the link between Mozambican SALW and South African crime is made by nearly any author writing on this subject.
7. Intervention during the workshop 17-20 September, 2003.
8. N Magudu & M Mosse, "Mozambique: a powder keg", IANSA newsletter, June 2003.

CHAPTER 1

DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES IN MOZAMBIQUE

The legacy of ONUMOZ

Analyses of the role of ONUMOZ—the United Nations (UN) mission leading the peace process in Mozambique—remain controversial. Much has already been written on the subject and it is not in the scope of this monograph to speculate further. The mandate of ONUMOZ was:

- To monitor and verify the ceasefire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons;
- To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and to provide security in the transport corridors;
- To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups; to authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures and to provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process;
- To provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process;
- To coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel and the affected local population.¹

For the purpose of this monograph the military component of the ONUMOZ mandate is most relevant, which is directly related to disarmament, as failures in this component may represent a heavy legacy for the government of Mozambique.

During the fieldwork for the publication, most Mozambicans stated that they were happy with the results of the UN mission, and did not hesitate in mentioning the successful organization of the first democratic elections in

1994 to emphasize their point. Their acknowledgement of the support of ONUMOZ in the consolidation of peace in Mozambique was far more modest however and many remark that ONUMOZ simply tapped into an already deep commitment to peace of the Mozambican people.

“The population was the weakest party in the conflict.... Tired of the dying, the maiming, and the other deprivations of war, the people were prepared to accept anything... and the fear of going back to war led the civil population to take reconciliation measures even before the ceasefire was in place.”²

Another point of consensus was the military component of ONUMOZ, which Mozambicans did not hesitate in labelling a failure. They are not the only ones who have made this assessment.³ The fact that most UN documents on ONUMOZ include but a few paragraphs on the disarmament process, as opposed to extensive debates on other aspects of the mission, seems to indicate the dissatisfaction of the UN itself with this area of work.

In all fairness, one has to say that given the political circumstances at the time, the UN mission was confronted with tough choices, which required rapid decisions in an environment still pervaded by mutual suspicions between the two warring parties. For the sake of the ultimate goal – to bring peace to a country that had experienced conflict for over 30 years – compromises had to be made. Furthermore, some of the prevailing problems seem to have been more the doing of the Government of Mozambique (GoM) at the time than with a lack of will or capacity of the UN to solve them. Nevertheless, the fact remains that when the UN withdrew in the end of 1994, the GoM inherited disgruntled armed forces, overstuffed paramilitary institutions, and the volatile combination of jobless demobilized soldiers and arms caches around the country in an economic environment offering few opportunities. Adding to this, weapons collected during the ONUMOZ period were handed over to the GoM, to arm an already over-armed army that had little capacity to manage the stockpiles under its supervision.⁴

The lack of an arms embargo on Mozambique during the ONUMOZ disarmament process also meant that new equipment may have been imported by both parties during that time.⁵ This meant that depleted arms caches could have been restocked, or relocated, with new equipment. Although there was no clear evidence that either party was importing weapons during ONUMOZ – the flow seemed to be moving out of Mozambique rather than into Mozambique – the collection of new weapons in some communities may

support the claim that weapons were being imported while the ONUMOZ mission was ongoing.⁶

Estimates on the number of small arms and light weapons (SALW) distributed to the Mozambican population during the war are disparate and range from 1.5 to 6 million.⁷ This monograph does not speculate on these numbers; suffice to say that large numbers of weapons were distributed by both sides and that it is widely agreed that only a small portion of these weapons were handed over to ONUMOZ. According to one of the interviewees, currently in the armed forces, during the war soldiers and officers would receive more than one weapon. Whenever they were transferred to a new station, they would get a new weapon, or a set of weapons (e.g. one handgun and one rifle). Although they were supposed to leave the weapons received at the barracks of assignment before leaving to take up their new positions, most did not. This meant that soldiers could accumulate several unrecorded weapons. At the time of demobilization, having little trust in the future, many soldiers and officers handed over the number of weapons they wished to or only the ones that were defective.⁸

According to this same source, ONUMOZ collected about 200,000 SALW and handed them over to the GoM; 24,000 are recorded as destroyed.⁹ Although ONUMOZ showed interest in destroying a larger number of SALW, the GoM did not allow it.¹⁰ The huge gap between the number of weapons collected by ONUMOZ and the estimates of those distributed, even if the lowest ones are considered, provide a good picture of the problem left behind:

- over-equipped armed forces (the main losers in the peace process) with little capacity to manage the existing stockpiles
- over-staffed paramilitary institutions
- unrecorded arms caches from both sides, spread throughout the country
- an 'army' of jobless demobilized soldiers with knowledge and access to hidden weapons

The need for further disarmament

If the impact of the problems afflicting both the armed forces and the paramilitary institutions were not immediately visible, the failure in collecting and destroying weapons used during the war soon became clear. As ONUMOZ was leaving the country whose security it was supposed to have guaranteed, crime rates in Mozambique, particularly in urban centres, soared. War was not a problem anymore, but the security of Mozambican citizens was again under threat. Furthermore, it was apparent that this threat was having spillover effects into neighbouring countries, mainly South Africa. Perhaps even more so than during the war, Mozambican insecurity was now taking on regional dimensions.

The crime situation

The number of reported crimes in Mozambique increased from 30,579 in 1994 to 37,396 in 1995 and 42,967 in 1996, an increase of thirteen per cent.¹¹ As statistics are not disaggregated, it is hard to know how many of these incidents included the use of firearms, but given the perceived reluctance of Mozambicans in reporting crime to the authorities (see chapter 4)¹² one can assume that a large percentage of these numbers represent violent crime. Different formal and informal sources seem to agree that violent crime peaked around 1996/1997 and has since decreased.¹³ Whatever the statistics say, the perception after 1994 was that violent crime was increasing in urban centres in Mozambique, as well as along main roads, thus constraining mobility, investment, and preventing the free flow of people and goods. In 1995 the GoM acknowledged that large quantities of illegal weapons were circulating in Mozambique, and announced a master plan to address the issue. The plan allowed for special rapid reaction units to be deployed to the main roads and areas most afflicted by crime, re-established police district commands, and provided for more cooperation with police forces in neighbouring countries.¹⁴

Regional impact

As the crime situation in Mozambique was worsening, the government of South Africa faced similar problems with increases in urban crime, while simultaneously struggling with internal conflict, including the taxi wars in KwaZulu-Natal. It was also clear that both violent urban crime and conflict were being fuelled with weapons flowing from Mozambique into South Africa. Countries in Southern Africa were still debating the institutionalization

of regional police cooperation and hence there was no formal umbrella for such cooperation,¹⁵ but the governments of the two countries felt they could wait no longer for a wider framework. Social stability, development and democracy in both countries were under threat. A problem had been clearly identified: illegal SALW were flowing from Mozambique into South Africa, fuelling violent crime and conflict. The source of these weapons was also known: they were hidden remnants of the Mozambican war. A rapid strategy had to be developed. It was in this context that President Mandela and President Chissano agreed on a common approach to curb the transfer of illegal SALW from Mozambique to South Africa – the destruction of arms caches in Mozambique. This cooperation programme was to be called Operation Rachel and proved to be one of the most successful initiatives of its kind.

Operation Rachel

Although South Africa and Mozambique had different motivations, they shared a common goal: the destruction of arms caches containing remnants of the war and the curbing of criminal networks between the two countries. For the South African Police Service (SAPS), this programme fell within the broader fight against violent urban crime. Mozambique's objective was the general disarmament of the country, mainly of the rural areas.

It was this common goal that enabled both countries to combine resources and overcome national boundaries: the SAPS had the means and the resources, which could be complemented with Mozambican knowledge of the field and the legitimacy for the intervention. The natural procedure would be to combine these resources into joint operations inside Mozambique and this is what was done – teams of Mozambican and South African police went into communities in order to destroy arms caches. That by doing so these teams were overcoming decades of mistrust between the two countries is equally remarkable and serves well to illustrate the capacity and the scope for regional cooperation.

The success of Operation Rachel, which started in 1995 and is still ongoing, is unquestionable – during the nine operations undertaken by mid-2003, over 600 arms caches have been discovered and several tons of weaponry and ammunition destroyed. Prior to Rachel operations the price of an AK-47 (the weapon most used during the Mozambican conflict) in Soweto was around R100 (USD 14); today, the same weapon costs R3,000 (USD 430),¹⁶ an impressive indicator. But the success of Operation Rachel seems to go beyond the direct impact of destroying SALW.

Overcoming historical constraints

Rachel operations are based on intelligence collected in Mozambican communities, thus contributing to the establishment of confidence between citizens and the police, and among security sector institutions; the information gathered is shared by the police of both countries and interventions are planned together, thus building capacity and ties between two countries that have mistrusted each other for decades. Communities that twenty years ago would have fled at the first sight of a South African uniform now welcome the South African and Mozambican police teams, whom they perceive as partners in their plight against the presence of SALW in their communities. The contribution of such initiatives to shifts in collective mentalities should not be underestimated.

Operation Rachel established the foundations for further cooperation between the two countries. The operations are evidence that historical resentments can be overcome; that joint-operations can be a strong vehicle for capacity building; that common goals can become an important motivator; that political will is paramount to overcoming certain constraints; and that like-minded people exist across borders. Clearly Rachel-type operations can make a strong contribution towards peace building in the region.

Disarmament as a corollary

However, Operation Rachel was not designed as a disarmament initiative for Mozambique but rather as a measure to prevent and control the transfer of SALW from Mozambique into South Africa. Disarmament seems to be a by-product of this strategy, rather than the main focus. Operation Rachel was considered to be one of the tools for crime prevention in South Africa, and the operations are principally funded from the budget of the South African Police Service (SAPS). Whereas the Mozambican police wished to cover the entire territory, the SAPS were initially more interested in the southern part of the country, as arms hidden there had a higher probability of ending up in South Africa.

In the early stages of Operation Rachel the common goal of destroying arms caches brought the institutions of both countries together. Later, different motivations began to surface and impact on the design of the operations – the further north the arms caches were, the more expensive the operation became, the more time was needed, and the more difficult the logistical arrangements.

Mozambique did not have either capacity or resources to proceed alone and South Africa did not wish to invest funds in initiatives with little benefit for South Africa. The South African Police Service, however, was willing to carry on building the capacity of their Mozambican counterparts and contributing staff, means and time. The problem of resources was overcome when donors started to contribute a greater portion of the budget for Operation Rachel – in 2003, for the first time since they started, Rachel was extended to all but two provinces in Mozambique: Inhambane and Sofala. Both these provinces have already been covered in previous operations – Inhambane has had seven incursions and Sofala ten, out of a total of 19 operations.

The need for national disarmament initiatives

The sustainability of South African contributions to initiatives with little impact in South Africa may eventually be questioned. The trend seems to be for South African support to decrease and for Mozambique to take more of a leading role in national disarmament initiatives. Due to the scarce resources of the Mozambican government, it is likely that such disarmament initiatives will need the support of a donor, or even several donors. A previous attempt by a donor to provide direct funding to the Ministry of Interior within the framework of Operation Rachel, thus giving Mozambican police more autonomy to plan and execute specific disarmament interventions, faced insurmountable obstacles and the funding was ultimately channelled via South Africa.

Disarmament will probably remain necessary for several more years in Mozambique, requiring an integrated strategy that goes beyond the current Rachel operations. The police in Mozambique have undertaken some interventions to 'deactivate' arms caches. The meaning of 'deactivation' however was not clear to the research team. According to some interviewees the material is normally destroyed by the Mozambican armed forces; according to others, it is stored and later destroyed during the next Rachel operations, as Mozambique has no resources for destruction; finally, according to others still, this equipment is stored and later will be 'sorted out'.

The assessment of the research team was that the three different statements are probably true and that the deactivation of such arms caches by the Mozambican police happens in an *ad hoc* manner due to the lack of a consolidated strategy. The presence of Rachel operations may so far have masked the need for an integrated approach to disarmament but the Ministry of Interior, as the lead institution within Mozambique, may consider the need to

begin to develop strategies for continued, transparent and sustainable disarmament in Mozambique.

The TAE project

Parallel to government-led disarmament initiatives like Operation Rachel, Mozambican civil society is also contributing to this effort with the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) Tools for Arms (TAE) project. This project covers currently 26 per cent of the Mozambican territory and by August 2001 it had exchanged 795,856 zinc sheets, 1,808 bicycles, 674 sewing machines, 1 tractor, 2,969 hoes, 532 ploughs, 202 doors, 402 windows, 78 kitchen utensils, 68 machettes and 600 kg of different seeds for 200,000 weapons and ammunition.¹⁷ According to the same source the project has benefited about 26,000 families.

Although TAE was originally aimed at individual weapon owners, it was soon realized that the weapons being traded in, were, in fact, coming from arms caches rather than private owners. This raised several problems that were not foreseen in the original design of the project: the occasional transport of large quantities of SALW from the caches to the TAE warehouse; the storage and control of stored SALW; and what to do with the information gathered on arms caches.

Through these adaptations, TAE today is viewed as a complementary project to Operation Rachel rather than as an autonomous programme. TAE is informed in advance about a Rachel operation, as they need the resources brought in by the South Africans to destroy the weapons that TAE has collected. TAE workers told the research team they rely on South African capacity to destroy large quantities of weapons, as the Mozambican police have no funds enabling such destruction. This poses a significant problem as TAE often has to store and control large quantities of SALW while waiting for the next Rachel operation. Handing this equipment over to the police does not seem an acceptable solution, due to the perceived lack of capacity of the Mozambican police to manage stockpiles under their supervision.

Complementarity and risks

According to a TAE worker, the complementarity of approach between the two initiatives is re-inforced by the fact that both TAE and Operation Rachel

use the same network of informants, with TAE providing Operation Rachel with information gathered in areas less accessible to, or more suspicious of the police. The inclusion of a civil society organization within the framework of a government-led initiative has so far worked very well and is commendable, but it entails a sizeable risk – a too close association between TAE and the government initiatives may raise concerns both within local communities and among donors. Communities seem to be more at ease passing sensitive information on arms caches to TAE than to the police. If they perceive too close an association between TAE and the police, this confidence may be damaged or lost. Likewise, some donors choose to fund civil society organizations if they are unable or unwilling to fund certain government agencies, and this could also be compromised.

But the close association of TAE to Operation Rachel also has a very positive side – it provides TAE with leverage when the destruction of arms caches has to be negotiated with their owners. According to TAE workers most current arms caches belong to the ‘big bosses’ (sic) of the country. They stated that often they have to go to the parliament to talk to the owners of SALW still hidden in Mozambique – and try to convince them to allow the removal of those caches.

“Civic education is being done in parliament these days rather than in the communities” jokes one of the TAE staff members. “The weapons belong to the political parties. We have collected large quantities of SALW in Tete and Sofala, with permission of the owners of those caches. Currently we know of another big arms cache in northern Mozambique. This cache is being protected by three shifts of guards. We were able to convince one of the shift-teams to hand over some of the weapons. They have been doing so and SALW have been handed over to us without the other shifts knowing. This is necessarily a very slow procedure, as suspicions cannot be raised. At the same time we are trying to convince the owner to allow the destruction of the whole cache. There is another one, which is still surrounded by landmines. We are also working with some officials in order to gain access to this cache. It is in Inhambane province.”¹⁸

Project design and reality

The challenge for the TAE project is the gap between the design of the project and the reality of its implementation. While TAE interventions and incentives

seem adequate for individual gun-owners, the project did not foresee dealing with arms caches. Faced with the reality of arms caches however, TAE staff have taken on the challenge and devised innovative approaches. It may be that destruction of arms caches is necessary in Mozambique in order to build the confidence of individual weapon owners to hand over their guns. If so, maybe TAE's original approach was ahead of its time. This seems plausible as now that arms caches are decreasing in the areas where TAE operates more individual owners are coming forward to exchange their weapons for tools.

TAE's work with communities on arms caches is important and should be incorporated into its project initiatives and incentives, making them relevant to the reality on the ground. TAE is in a unique position at the community level.

The significance of arms caches

The statement by TAE workers that most arms caches are currently owned by political parties in Mozambique may shed some light on changing perceptions and should be considered when designing any disarmament strategy. This is particularly so when TAE workers also state that:

“... these owners are usually open to talk to us. The only resistance we have encountered so far has been in terms of precaution, in terms of collaboration and never outright resistance. These officers and political parties do not want to be associated to these caches, because their best political chances come when they talk about peace and not revenge”.¹⁹

In his monograph on the status of arms flows in Mozambique, Martinho Chachiua considers three sources of SALW in Mozambique: a) caches belonging to both warring parties; b) caches belonging to demobilized soldiers or soldiers still with the armed forces; and c) weapons retained by individual citizens.²⁰

Mozambique had the first democratic elections, both for parliament and for the presidency, in 1994, two years after the signing of the GPA. The experience of the first UN-supervised Angolan elections was still too recent to be easily overlooked and as much as Mozambicans wished peace, both warring parties were still distrustful of each other. And so, they held on to their arms caches, which gave them leverage should the electoral process go wrong. As it turned out, the first Mozambican elections were a tremendous success with

more than 85% voter turnout, giving the ruling party Frelimo 129 seats in parliament and 112 to Renamo. Frelimo's candidate for president, Joaquim Chissano, got 53.3% of the votes, while Renamo's candidate, Afonso Dhlakama, received 33.7%.

But confidence building is slow and the electoral process was tarnished by a day-long boycott by Renamo. In addition, at a time of emerging political stability, insecurity was rising. Crime rates were soaring and travelling on Mozambican main roads was becoming unsafe again. It is thus conceivable that in the period following the first elections, both Renamo and Frelimo would still maintain arms caches – Renamo in order to keep some political leverage, Frelimo in order to guarantee military supremacy. Given the political importance that these caches still had at the time, one can assume that the guards keeping them would be paid their salaries, thus alleviating the temptation to sell the weapons to third parties or to trade in information on their whereabouts.

Authors writing on SALW in Mozambique establish the link between the weapons being used in crime in 1994/1995 and demobilized soldiers. Vines, who worked extensively with demobilized soldiers, presents this link through interviews with Mozambican arms smugglers.²¹

Impact of disarmament initiatives on perceptions

Perhaps the best indicator of the success of both of these programmes – Operation Rachel and TAE – is the shifting in the perceptions of the origin of the weapons being used in crime. Whereas in 1994/1995 no one would hesitate in attributing weapons being used in crime to arms caches stocked with remnants of the war, and provision or use of those weapons by demobilized soldiers, perceptions on this issue today seem to have shifted. The general perception of the link between demobilized soldiers and crime was disputed by several people during the field work, although it still seems to prevail.

According to an official in the Ministry of Interior,

“Arms are occasionally used to commit crime but not always. Most criminals are middle aged, demobilized soldiers and unemployed. For instance the murderer of Siba Siba²² was a former soldier with *Casa Militar*, trained by the Chinese. The guns used are mainly AKM and Makarov pistols – remains from the war, because some criminals are

connected to people who, during the war, were assigned to arms caches. Other guns are leased from people, who own them legally or have been purchased from the people guarding an arms cache... In Maputo there are two types of crime – organized crime and petty crime for economic reasons. They tend to use the same types of guns, only some organized crime use other tactics, mainly when the criminals are former soldiers (for instance, the case of Siba Siba). – The former soldiers of *Casa Militar*, who guarantee security to the government, are known to organized crime bosses... Some demobilized soldiers prefer to say that they are unemployed rather than former *Casa Militar*.”²³

Members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working with demobilized soldiers refute the perception that demobilized soldiers are more prone to crime than any other group. During the survey carried out in Chimoio, none of the respondents mentioned demobilized soldiers in connection to crime. Without going too far into this debate, it is possible that this dual perception may be linked to the existence of arms caches and to the impact of disarmament initiatives still ongoing in Mozambique. It is possible that demobilized soldiers are not more prone to crime than other groups, but given the economic hardship in which most of them live and given the access they may have had to hidden weapons it is hard to believe that some would not be tempted in selling these weapons to those looking for them, including criminal networks. This may well have been the case immediately after 1994, but as more arms caches are being destroyed this type of supply may be decreasing and thus dispelling the perceived linkages of demobilized soldiers to crime. Every dismantled arms cache is one less source of weapons, regardless of the nature of the market.

Both government officials and NGO workers have often stated that the weapons seized currently in relation to crime seem to be new and not remnants of the war. According to a community-based worker, “When we go to the communities, we are able to collect weapons that are brand new. Where do they come from? And why are they bringing them to us, instead of handing them over for destruction?”²⁴ The obvious answer seems to be that they may not trust government institutions to manage those weapons.

One can only speculate on the origin of these new weapons: if they come from arms caches, then the suspicion of ONUMOZ that both warring parties were importing armaments at the time seems to have been substantiated. But there is another possible source of these weapons and that is the stockpiles under government supervision. This seems to be the most common perception these

days in Mozambique – that crime is being committed with weapons sold or rented out to criminals by policemen or soldiers. The survey carried out in Chimoio seems to confirm this general perception.

In his address to parliament in February 2003, the Attorney General of Mozambique substantiates this perception by specifically mentioning what he considers to be two types of military crimes currently being committed in Mozambique: 1) the theft of military equipment for sale, and 2) the lending or renting of war armament to criminals:

“... However, one has to admit there are military crimes that did not disappear with the end of the war. Some examples are:

- Situations such as the one in Beira where, due to manifest irresponsibility some officers used war armaments against the police, attacking a police station;
- the theft of military equipment and subsequent sale of this equipment;
- the lending or the renting of armament to criminals for their criminal activities;
- the failure of those chosen for the Mandatory Military Service in reporting for service and other infractions not directly related to a war situation but which should be prevented with special measures”²⁵

This problem serves to highlight the need to address the wider security sector in Mozambique, as part of any strategy aiming the prevention and control of SALW and the curbing of crime in the region. Ten years after the GPA it seems timely for both the GoM and donors to look into this sector with the aim of its integration into the broader objectives of development and poverty eradication.

The issue of the ‘new weapons’ being found, as mentioned by several of the interviewees remained unclear for the research team. People connected both to Operation Rachel and to the TAE project mentioned often that some weapons in caches seem to have never been used and also that most of the equipment is in good working condition. Some of the NGO workers were quite adamant that such ‘new’ weapons could not have been in caches, but were not able to substantiate their statements.

This case seems to be a good example to illustrate the need for a marking system for the weapons being used by the police and military in Mozambique. In the absence of such marking, speculation on the origin of weapons being used in crime will be difficult to curb. It is in the interest of the GoM to implement such markings, thus enabling a more accurate picture of the relationship between legal and illegal weapon owners in Mozambique

Notes

1. See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumozM.htm> (April 2003).
2. M Chachia & M Malan, "Anomalies and acquiescence: the Mozambican peace process revisited", *African Security Revue* 7 (4), 1998, <<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7No4/Anomalies/html>> (October 2003).
3. In an email from a NYU student to Ambassador Kamal dated November 6, 2000 on ONUMOZ, the mission is considered as having had three failures: disarmament, the re-integration of former combatants, and few weapons destroyed. Document available at <<http://www.geocities.com/decharles24/assignment7.html>> (April 2003).
4. A Vines, "The struggle continues: Light weapons destruction in Mozambique", *Basic Papers*, April 1998, Number 25, 1998, <<http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP25.htm>> (June 2003). It is not clear where Vines got the data enabling him to make such a statement but if the FADM were not overarmed before ONUMOZ, they surely became overarmed after ONUMOZ. In 1994 when ONUMOZ left, the army had a total of about 12,000 soldiers and officers and ONUMOZ handed over around 200,000 SALW to this force.
5. BASIC, Africa: the challenge of light weapons destruction during peacekeeping missions, *Basic Papers*, December 1997, Number 23, <<http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP23.htm>> (October 2003).
6. Personal interview with NGO worker in May 2003. The same statement was made by civil society representatives during the workshop in September.
7. Vines, op.cit.
8. Personal interview in August 2003.
9. This number seems to be in agreement with quantities cited by M Chachia, "The status of arms flows in Mozambique", ISS, Monograph 34, 1999, <<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No34/TheStatus.html>> (October 2003).
10. A Vines, op.cit.

11. M Chachia, "Internal security in Mozambique: Concerns versus policies", *African Security Review* 9 (1), 2000, <[http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/9No1/%20Security Mozambique.html](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/9No1/%20Security%20Mozambique.html)>, (October 2003).
12. This reluctance in reporting crime has been noted by most authors writing on criminal issues in Mozambique.
13. Personal interviews with both government officials and citizens during the field research.
14. A Vines, op.cit.
15. N Stott, Learning from practice: Weapons collection in Southern Africa, an assessment of Operation Rachel, Institute for Security Studies, forthcoming.
16. N Stott, op.cit.
17. Greeting Speech by the Secretary General of the CCM, Rev. Lucas Amosse, during the National Conference on the Proliferation of Illicit SALW, Maputo, August 29-31, 2001. Available at <[http://www.arms.tropical.co.mz/\(docs\)sgccm.htm](http://www.arms.tropical.co.mz/(docs)sgccm.htm)>. The figure of 200,000 weapons includes ammunition. A more recent, still unpublished, BICC evaluation of the project states that TAE has collected more than 7,000 firearms and more than 200,000 rounds of ammunition since the beginning of the project.
18. Personal interview in July 2003.
19. Personal interview in June 2003.
20. M Chachia, "*The status of arms flows in Mozambique*", op.cit.
21. A Vines, op.cit.
22. Siba Siba Macuácuá was a young Mozambican economist auditing the accounts of Bank Austral, whose funds were apparently depleted by corruption in the higher ranks of the Frelimo party. Carlos Cardoso was investigating a similar case in another bank, the BCM, at the time of his death. Siba Siba "fell" from the 7th floor of the building and his death was firstly attributed to accident or suicide. Later a demobilized soldier was arrested as his murderer. His family is currently seeking to bring Siba Siba's murder to justice.
23. Personal interview in April 2003.
24. Personal interview with a peace promoter working with a Mozambican NGO.
25. Speech by the Attorney General – Dr. Joaquim Madeira – to the Parliament on Feb.20, 2003. Available at <<http://www.govmoz.gov.mz/>>.

Chapter 2

Reform of the Security Sector

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Weapons in Mozambique, Reducing Availability and Demand

Ana Leão

No matter how many creative disarmament initiatives may be developed, none will be successful if equal measures to develop an institutional culture guided by a common national vision within the security sector are not taken.

The concept of security sector used in this monograph is based on the definition provided by Nicole Ball, who identifies the key actors in the security sectors as:

- "Defense and intelligence bodies: armed forces; paramilitary forces; coast guards; militias and intelligence services;
- Criminal justice organizations: police, judiciary and correctional services;
- Security-sector management and oversight bodies: legislatures and legislative committees; ministries of defense, internal affairs, justice, foreign affairs; office of the president; and financial management bodies (ministries of finance, budget offices, auditor's general's offices); other oversight bodies such as human rights ombudsman, police commissions;
- Non-core security institutions: customs and other uniformed bodies"¹

The violent history of Mozambique has created a culture of violence, aggression and impunity within the security sector, which still pervades security institutions and which needs to be dispelled. Colonialism came to Mozambique with the contours of the fascist dictatorship in mainland Portugal and the security sector was used to cement the regime and destroy any type of eventual opposition. Police, for instance, were used to imposing public order by whichever means deemed necessary. Thus, security forces became the public face of an oppressive regime. The boundaries between army, police and secret service were blurred enough to create the perception that none of these institutions would have security concerns other than the ones connected to the maintenance of the state. Furthermore, this perception, coupled with constant harassment, alienated the population from giving any eventual support to these institutions. For Mozambicans in colonial times the sight of soldiers or policemen could only be an omen of bad news.

In mainland Portugal this image was dispelled when the security forces overthrew the oppressive fascist regime, however in Mozambique the picture was different. Mozambicans saw the colonial administration replaced by a party that was supported by the majority of the population while deeply rooted in military culture. Frelimo became a highly militarized political party partly by force of circumstances and partly by choice.

Once independence was achieved, on 25 September 1975, there was no opportunity for either demilitarization of the Frelimo party, or for a re- structuring of the security sector. Surrounded by the hostile regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, Mozambique felt justifiably threatened and hence adopted the need for strong armed forces able to defend the country against foreign intervention. President Machel envisioned a professional army but the period of peace was too short to allow for its development. Soon after independence, the then-Rhodesian regime, tapping on internal dissent to Marxist policies and angry at Mozambique's support of Mugabe, established and supported the Renamo movement in Mozambique. Civil war soon ravaged the country. As such, the culture of aggression instilled in the guerrilla forces during the struggle for independence was never questioned, but rather encouraged. It also

meant that the military wing of the party was strengthening its position instead of assuming a subordinate role to the political leadership. The Ministry of Interior and the military were perhaps the most powerful institutions during the civil war and were accountable only to the President; budgets and recruitment, for instance, were never questioned and the activities of the security sector were conducted with little oversight.

The Armed Forces

“What the UN never understood is that you do not dismantle an army; you reform an army. In our case, our army was dismantled.”² This seems to be the prevailing sentiment among armed forces of Mozambique (FADM) officers.³ But this resentment against ONUMOZ may be partially misdirected. The armed forces themselves and the government of the time contributed equally to the current situation of the military. In fact, instead of contributing towards an effective demobilization of the armed forces and their reform, the government simply shifted great numbers of soldiers to the police force (outside the ONUMOZ mandate) and let the armed forces, now perceived as less manageable since members of Renamo were being incorporated into the new army, wither.

But the military, by failing to put their own house in order, must also share the blame for inaction. The time may not have been the most suitable for a reform of the security sector, as the militaries of both sides represented the greatest threat to the peace process. Frelimo officers had everything to lose. Salomons provides a very accurate picture of the status within the armed forces:

“... While the leadership in both parties was committed to peace, not all their followers were. The big losers in the process, on both sides, were the military. They had not played much of a role in the peace negotiations; in fact, one could argue that the Frelimo civilian leadership, in framing the scope of the peace accord, had managed not only to eliminate Renamo's threat but also the crushing burden of its own military... This was the end of a lucrative industry. The Government handed over some \$240 million each year to the military in one large lump sum, and the military were not accountable to anyone for the way this money was spent. When we saw the dilapidated barracks, the equipment rusting away in the rain, the lack of preparedness of the Mozambican troops, we wondered where this money had gone – certainly not into any military infrastructure. When we heard the soldiers' laments about the many months they had not been paid, we realized the money had not gone into payroll either. The Ministry of Finance confirmed that the Army had never submitted a payroll, and that the estimates of the number of soldiers under arms had never been audited.... Clearly, the demilitarization of Mozambique was going to cramp the style of some of the military leaders....”⁴

On their side, Renamo officers, with generally low literacy rates and few skills other than those pertaining to warfare, feared civilian life and felt uncertain of their role in the new armed forces. Their status during the war was high and their positions and opinions were respected, even if only out of fear. Survival for them and their families was guaranteed as long as the rule of 'might is right' prevailed. It is suspected that many had strong ties to smuggling routes and traffickers and thus controlled businesses providing extra income. The General Peace Agreement (GPA) brought an end to this accommodating situation and made them face the possibility of a dubious future in civilian life. For both Renamo and Frelimo, ONUMOZ represented a great opportunity to curtail the power of a sector they may have perceived as too powerful. For the government of Mozambique (GoM), the army had long been a financial burden; for Renamo, the transition from armed movement to political party meant that more power had to be ascribed to its political wing. ONUMOZ offered both parties an opportunity to dismantle their militaries with little fuss and the added bonus of shifting accountability to foreign institutions.

Demobilization and the new armed forces

In spite of this military-political transition, the distrust between the two warring parties was still too recent to allow complete demobilization of both sides and naturally they wished to keep some kind of military leverage. Frelimo could count on the militias it had created during the war and also on the soldiers who were transferred from the army into the police; Renamo excluded some battalions from the demobilization process and had them stationed in remote areas. The suspicion that such battalions exist, persists today – rumours of Renamo soldiers in the area of Maringue abound; during the survey carried out in Chimoio, the research team was often told of a group of two female battalions still stationed around Inhaminga.⁵ The result created many of the problems the security sector still faces today – disgruntled armed forces with little capacity to protect the territory, albeit overarmed, and a police force overstuffed with men untrained for police service.

The GPA, in Protocol IV, provided for the formation of new national armed forces manned with 30,000 soldiers coming from both sides (24,000 for the army, 4,000 for the air force, and 2,000 for the navy). This target has never been achieved in spite of the new military law that includes mandatory conscription for every Mozambican citizen at 18 years.

Military leaders interviewed during the fieldwork complain that benefits given by ONUMOZ to soldiers being demobilized were better than anything the army could offer and thus most soldiers chose to demobilize rather than join the new army. Research conducted for this monograph on demobilization in Mozambique suggests other motives as well, for example the negative image of the armed forces among the population and the fact that few were given the choice to join the new FADM.

During interviews with demobilized soldiers, many stated that it had been their leaders who had selected those who should be integrated into the new army;⁶ only a few were given the choice and in the sample all those asked declined the offer. None expressed the wish to return to the military service and most extended this rebuttal to their children, stating that they would not like to see their children doing military service. Most seem to consider the period they spent in the military as a disruption of their normal lives. They also admit that if they were with the military now their lives would probably be easier from an economic point of view, but this perceived advantage does not seem motivation enough to join the military.

Whatever the reasons, the reality is that when ONUMOZ left, what had once been a powerful army in the region was reduced to about 9,000 sergeants and officers and about 3,000 foot soldiers, most of them too old for military life; dilapidated barracks and warehouses; fleets of airplanes and boats unable to move from the places where they were stationed; and huge stockpiles of small arms and light weapons (SALW) with inefficient control mechanisms. These material conditions were complemented with the perception of widely disseminated corruption among the ranks and a public image that instilled fear in the population. Without any meaningful support from donors for the sector, and unable to attract young people into the military, the GoM decided it had little choice but to reintroduce mandatory conscription.

Conscription

Mandatory conscription however is not the best tool to professionalize armed forces. It is estimated that each year 15 per cent of the selected conscripts fail to come forward and present themselves, and approximately 90 per cent of the recruits who do enroll choose to leave the army after the two years of mandatory service. Those who decide to stay are not always the most skilled.⁷ Most military leaders interviewed by the research team expressed regret at this situation – they know that conscription is resulting from the need to staff an ‘army of generals’ and to man nearly abandoned barracks rather than forming any part of a strategy for reform.

The recourse to mandatory conscription has been controversial – the opposition in parliament questioned the rationality of such an exercise given the scarce financial resources of the Mozambican state. Young Mozambicans were not happy with this measure either and seem to have found ways of evading it. According to the law, every Mozambican citizen must register for military service the year s/he turns 18. The army then puts them through medical tests, selects from those deemed fit and trains them for two years. However, most Mozambicans upon reaching 18 simply do not register and there is no legal mechanism to make them do so—legal sanctions were foreseen only against those who register and then fail to show up when called to join the FADM.

Military registration started with an ‘extraordinary period’ of two months (August and September) in 1998. It was expected that over a million Mozambicans would register but one week before the final date only about 51,634 of the expected number had registered; at the end of the exercise only 140,000 from the expected million had registered. The government had foreseen the inclusion of 3,000 conscripts but ended up with only 1,000, all males.⁸ This pattern has been repeated each year. In 2003, from the estimated 424,000 Mozambicans turning 18, only 21,000 youth registered.⁹

Military leaders are aware of the important contributions the security forces can make to the building of national cohesion and identity. “Army structure, with its egalitarian principles, is ideal for reconciliation among fighters,” stated a former Renamo general, currently with the FADM.¹⁰ They see the army as an institution able to bring some structure to a society whose fabric has been disrupted by civil war; as an institution with the potential to provide capacity and to integrate young people, who otherwise will have little or no education/training opportunities; as an institution worthy of respect rather than neglect. And they are right in their assessment of what the FADM can be and represent.

Currently the FADM have approximately 15,000 men and women, 9,000 of whom are officers.¹¹ To assist in providing food for these troops, the FADM have recently started a farming programme in some areas. This

programme also intends to build capacity among the soldiers. Members of the armed forces will spend 40 per cent of their time with farming and livestock activities and 60 per cent with military activities.¹² The FADM are looking for donor support for these activities. However unusual, such intentions are commendable and show a tremendous will within the FADM to overcome the difficulties they face. This initiative has raised some concerns among civil society regarding the legitimacy of using soldiers as labour and may not find sympathy among the international community for similar reasons but does need to be recognized for its approach.

The dilapidated barracks and warehouses are a constant cause of concern, as the explosion of an ammunition warehouse in Beira, which was hit by lightning, testifies.¹³ These facilities, which once stood alone, are now surrounded by populations and represent a risk their design does not accommodate. But these barracks and warehouses also represent assets that can be used to different purposes and generate some income – they can be sold or rented out to other institutions or private parties, for instance. The amount of infrastructure needed by the FADM will depend on the nature of the FADM itself and as such decisions on the infrastructure – how many, which type and where – should be part of any strategy for security sector reform.

Stockpiles

Regarding armaments, it was not possible to obtain exact figures for the weapons under FADM control. However the central question should not concern numbers of weapons but rather how equipment is recorded, stored and controlled. Interviewees seemed to agree that the FADM are overarmed, in the sense that the firearms handed over by ONUMOZ alone can arm each soldier 10 times over, but no one seems to know exactly to what extent the FADM is overarmed. That is, in quantitative terms the numbers are high but there has been no assessment on the quality of the equipment currently under the supervision of the armed forces. There is a registration system for every weapon or piece of equipment in possession of the FADM but it is a manual system of simple entries in a logbook, viewed as ineffective and unreliable. During the workshop undertaken during the fieldwork, participants of the FADM acknowledged the need to take an inventory of both stockpiles and storage facilities, recognizing that such inventories are integral to a broader strategy for reform.

The Police

If the armed forces present a dismal picture, the police forces, albeit having more support from both government and donors, seem to suffer from an equally damaged image while still struggling with the legacy of the peace process. Although the GPA called for a new army combining men from both sides, such a clause was not included for the police. Moreover, the GPA also stipulated that both armies should be disarmed and demobilized but policing activities should continue under the scope of the PRM – *Polícia da Republica de Moçambique* (Mozambican Police Service).

The CIVPOL mission

The police thus represented the ideal tool for Frelimo to retain a kind of military leverage, since it could not count any longer on the support of a Frelimo army. Much has been written on the difficulties surrounding the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) mission in Mozambique, whose mandate was "... to monitor the conduct of the indigenous police force during this delicate time in Mozambique's history".¹⁴ Both the UN and Renamo desired a large UN police presence to guarantee public security whereas Frelimo saw such a presence as an incursion into national sovereignty – public security being the competence of a national government. Frelimo may have been right on this point, but there was another reason to restrict CIVPOL – the transfer of military personnel to the national police had started in 1990, with the peace negotiations,¹⁵ and would continue well into the CIVPOL mission in Mozambique. According to Woods:

"Over time, it became increasingly clear to CIVPOL officers that government military troops and equipment were being transferred to the police, especially to the Presidential Guard... CIVPOL officers were sometimes denied access to site where military personnel and equipment were suspected of being converted to police use. In one case, a visiting Security Council delegation was inadvertently shown an undeclared police training camp where police recruits were being trained in machine-gun use. Later, CIVPOL officers were denied access to the camp when they asked to verify the report."¹⁶

The government of the time, motivated perhaps more by political survival rather than by concerns of public security,

delayed as much as possible the deployment of the UN civilian police, whose first personnel arrived only in September 1993. Given the lack of cooperation within the PRM and the low capacity of many members of the CIVPOL contingent, when the CIVPOL left in 1994 little had been done to improve the capacity of the PRM or to improve the crime situation. As Martinho Chachiuva states " ... despite the internal security environment, characterized by criminal violence, the need for political survival kept security policies apart from security needs." 17

Transfers from the military to the police

Whatever the circumstances, the reality is that when ONUMOZ left, the GoM had a police force that was more of a partisan body than a modernized institution; overstuffed with members who had military rather than police training; with little regard, or knowledge, of human rights and internationally accepted procedures; unable to stop crime; a police force that the population perceived as a foe rather than as a friend, awash with corruption and operating with impunity. Nevertheless, the transfer of military personnel to the police continued – although no new recruits were hired between 1994 and 1998, the police grew from 18,047 to 21,666. 18 This transfer meant that the problems within the police forces, such as low levels of education and inadequate training, were being compounded rather than addressed.

Another outcome of transferring military personnel to the police is that the police budget is spent on salaries for officers that may have never wanted to be police, thereby diverting funds that could have been allocated to equipment and modernization of the police force. It also meant that no new staff could be recruited, as there was no budget to pay additional salaries.

However since 1997 the PRM has been included in several bilateral assistance projects, which are having a visible impact; emphasized by several of the interviewees. Yet not all the problems from the past are solvable with assistance; they require political will translated into practical measures. The PRM has started recruiting new officers in 2003, which is a good sign. These new recruits will be trained in the Police Academy, established with donor funds in 1999. 19 The PRM are currently about 20,000 strong giving a ratio of one policeperson per 1,089 inhabitants, which is low for the size of the country (overstaffing in the police forces refers not to the amount but rather to the composition of the police staff). 20 However recruiting alone will not be enough and will need to be coupled with a restructuring of resources, including equipment and personnel.

In terms of equipment, the PRM seems to lack many of the things that could turn it into a well functioning institution: the criminal labs have a lower productivity rate than in the 1980s; there are not enough laboratories; of the 321 vehicles nationwide owned by the PRM only 200 are operational. 21 In terms of weapons it was not possible to obtain stockpile figures, but the Strategic Plan of the PRM states: "The PRM has enough armaments for the current amount of personnel, however, the characteristics of the armaments are not adequate to the mission of maintaining law and order." 22 The document notes further that the PRM lacks equipment traditionally used by the police, including batons, handcuffs, and whistles. This seems to imply that in spite of donor support to the PRM, the equipment at its disposal is of a military rather than policing nature. Each PRM station is supposed to have a registry for weapons, both the station's equipment and privately owned firearms, but this registry is a handwritten ledger book. These records should be periodically sent to the Central Command in Maputo, but no interviewee could specify exactly how often this occurs. The PRM and the Ministry of Interior are the main actors in the control of SALW – they issue firearm licenses and are responsible for overseeing and updating the records. The degree to which this can happen under current resource constraints, however, is unclear. 23

National legislation on firearms

National regulation on SALW is important as most illicit weapons were first diverted from legal sources. As such, national laws managing the possession, manufacture and use of firearms must be part of any strategy aimed at reducing the availability of firearms within a country. The Mozambican law on the licensing of firearms dates from pre-independence and was written for another era: it is vague, outdated and bureaucratic to enforce.

The legislation regulating firearm ownership – Law 1/73, issued in January 1973 covers firearms and ammunition. It is an elaborate and complicated decree that includes provisions covering knives, daggers and other artifacts. The law sets out classifications for different types of weapons. These include:

- personal defence

- hunting
- sport
- ornamentation
- arms other than firearms (knives, daggers, traditional arms), and
- war equipment.

According to the legislation, firearms with characteristics other than those defined in the decree are to be classified according to the discretion of the General Command of the Police.

In addition, the law defines:

- rules for import and export of firearms by individuals;
- procedures for the establishment and running of commercial firearm dealerships;
- yearly limits for the ammunition sold to individuals;
- possession limits for individual citizens (up to three firearms: one for self-defence and two from the other categories (hunting, sport) with the equivalent ammunition for one year);
- rules to register and to control firearms in possession of individual citizens and of legal traders;
- that the President, the Prime Minister, Ministers, Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State, General Directors and Vice-directors in Ministries, Senior Inspectors, members of Parliament, General and Provincial secretaries, judicial magistrates or magistrates from the Public Attorney, district governors, army officers still in service, as reservists or retired, and staff with the General Directorate of Security while on duty, can own (and use) whichever firearm they wish, without registering them and without applying for a license (chapter IV; Section I; Article 55);
- two types of licenses – one solely for possession and one for possession, use and transport of firearms as well as the procedures to apply for such licenses;
- rules for building and maintaining warehouses for firearms and ammunition, as well as amounts allowed for storage;
- rules for the establishment of ammunition workshops;
- rules for transport of firearms and ammunition;
- how control should be undertaken by the government bodies;

- sanctions for non-compliance;
- amounts to be paid by type of license; and
- responsibilities of the police in keeping records and in controlling compliance with the law.

The decree also contains models for the several types of forms required and for the licenses being issued.

If the applicant's request to buy a weapon is granted, each year the licensed owner is supposed to report to the police station of the residence area, in order to either confirm or update residential information. Each license must be renewed every two years. In the case of the death of the licensed owner, the survivors must report his/her death to the police station of the residence area and hand in the weapon to the PRM. Records are supposed to be updated with each of these procedures.

The research team was told on more than one occasion that firearms were handed to members of parliament and to members of the government without making an application; however, this perception was refuted by one officer with the Ministry of the Interior, who stated that "Members of Parliament or of the government also have to apply for firearms."²⁴ And have they ever refused such applications? "Not so far, but not everybody who is entitled to have a firearm has applied for one."²⁵ And another officer, present during the interview, added:

"Listen, we try to convince these people they do not need a firearm. In fact, we try to convince anyone applying for a firearm that they do not need one. We do not like the idea of having firearms around. After all, we are the ones directly hit when crimes with guns go wrong. It is in our interest to know what is out there and who has it."²⁶

Applications for firearms licenses are analysed on a case-by-case basis, motivations are questioned and officers with the Ministry of Interior were visibly reluctant to issue licenses, as they themselves admitted to the research team. Currently, the Ministry of Interior has about 7,000 registered legal owners of firearms.²⁷

The officers interviewed in the Ministry of Interior and in the police forces seemed to be well aware of the difficulties in their jobs. They are committed officers doing their best with the existing conditions, they are well aware of the steps that should be taken and of the measures that should be adopted. They show some embarrassment when talking about the shortcomings in their departments, which shows a high degree of devotion; and they discouraged any political interference in their jobs.

Private security companies

This was particularly obvious when the team tried to discuss the control of armament in possession of private security companies. As one police officer told us: "Don't ask me anything on private security companies because I do not want to go into that. Too many important people are involved."²⁸ The law on security companies was approved in 1990 at a time when crime rates were increasing in urban areas and, with the war still going on, the security forces were unable to cope. There are currently 31 private security companies registered in Mozambique.

The law in itself is quite simple, although with ample room for interpretation. In essence, it establishes the bureaucratic steps to start a company and sets minimum requirements for hiring staff and oversight by the Ministry of Interior. It excludes private security companies from any criminal investigation and from using systems or methods potentially harmful to citizens.

The decree permits private security companies to protect property and individuals and undertake surveillance activities. Private security companies may also "manufacture and market equipment and other goods concerning private security, in accordance with the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Commerce after consultation with the Ministry of Interior."²⁹ The law also defines the forms of security (guard, garrison, and patrol) and establishes the rules for licensing and documents to be assembled by the applicant, giving scope to the Ministry of Interior and/or to the provincial governors to require additional information. It sets deadlines for approval and establishes the

minimum amounts for financial guarantees. It also states that the licenses cannot be sold or passed over to third parties and establishes fines for those not licensed.

In terms of who may be hired as guards, the law specifies that they must be:

- national citizens with full political rights;
- over 25 years old;
- able bodied and approved by a team of medical doctors;
- without criminal or police records;
- and to have completed at least grade seven, or equivalent training (not specified).

Companies hiring staff without these requirements are subject to a fine between 200,000 and 600,000 meticas (equivalent to USD 10-30), but it is not clear if this fine is one-off or if staff in breach of these requirements must be fired. This is an important point, as from the security guards questioned by the research team, most were demobilized soldiers and none had completed grade seven.³⁰ Regarding the training of the security guards, the law stipulates that it is left to the companies to train their own guards, at their discretion. Further articles establish the obligations and duties of private security companies and fines for non-compliance. The law also defines the equipment that private security guards may use, including firearms, dogs, vehicles, uniforms, and identification tags.

Regarding firearms allowed to be in possession of private security guards the law states:³¹

“1. Private security guards can only possess defence guns when on duty as body-guards, protecting banks or cash in transit.

2. In terms of this Regulation, defence guns are:

- a) semi-automatic pistols with caliber up to 7.65 mm, whose barrel is no longer than 7.5 cm;
- b) revolvers with a calibre of less than 9 mm, whose barrel is no longer than 10 cm;
- c) semi-automatic rifles of a caliber up to 7.65 mm”³²

This article is ambiguous in its coverage of automatic weapons as they are not explicitly excluded. In addition, private security guards were seen with machine guns and carrying weapons on occasions other than the ones mentioned in the above reference.

Article 33 of the law establishes that the police should monitor and survey the activities of private security companies and companies that do not comply with inspections can be fined. The weapons used by private security guards are controlled by the hiring company. Each company undergoes a monthly inspection of its stockpiles by two officers from the PRM.

Some of the interviewed officers provided insight on what the PRM sees as major gaps in the current legislation. According to them, the law should be far more specific on the criteria needed to start a security company and also on the criteria for hired staff. It should establish a minimum salary for armed security guards. The average monthly salary for armed security guards is approximately MZM 800,000 (USD 33), which leaves them vulnerable to bribery or criminal involvement. The law should also regulate the number of hours on duty for armed security guards.

Ultimately, the law should demand proof that the guards know how to handle the weapons they are using. This was identified as a breach in the current legislation both for firearm licensing of individuals and for private security companies. Recently clay pigeon shooting-ranges have opened around Maputo. These premises function without regulation, as there is no Mozambican legislation that provides for this type of activity. The Mozambican police are not against such facilities, on the contrary, they seem to agree that such premises could be useful as learning

facilities, should the law be updated. However, they expressed concern at the legal gap in which they operate currently.

Efficient law enforcement needs more than a well-structured and professional police force – it needs also a judiciary system able to complement police activities and able to enforce laws and sanctions. This is not the case currently in Mozambique, where the judiciary system lacks human resources with capacity, survives in degrading infrastructures and is vulnerable to corruption. In spite of the great improvements to the judiciary and the ongoing donor support much needs still to be done.

Notes

1. N Bale, "Security sector reform and good governance in developing countries", <http://payson.tulane.edu/seminars/Security_sector_files/outline.htm> (October 2003).
2. Personal interview, September 2003.
3. FADM – *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* (Mozambican Armed Forces) are the post-GPA army, incorporating fighters from both sides of the civil war.
4. Salomons, ONUMOZ: The United Nations in Mozambique, 2000, <<http://www.intlmgmt.com/publicmanagement/mozambique.htm>> (May 2003).
5. Maringue and Inhaming were Renamo strongholds in the northern Province of Sofala in Mozambique.
6. This can also be attributed to the fact that most interviewees had been recruited under age.
7. Personal interview, September 2003.
8. AIM report No. 143, September 1998, <<http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim143.html>> and No. 149, January 1999, <<http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim149.html>> (February 2003).
9. Panafrican News Agency Daily Newswire, 8 April 2003, "Young Mozambicans shun military service".
10. Personal interview November 2002.
11. Personal interview October 2003.
12. AIM, October 2003, posted on <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/2003101_00566.html> (October 2003)
13. During the workshop this was a constant concern expressed by the members of the armed forces attending. They mentioned specifically this incident in Beira in November 2002. A live account of it can be found on <<http://www.decatordaily.com/decatordaily/news/021101/missionary.shtml>>. According to this source, "the exploding munitions caused thousands to flee, killed six, injured at least 50 others and destroyed fifty houses

within a three-mile radius of the depot.”

14. J L Woods, *Mozambique: The CIVPOL operation*, <<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201998/Policing%20the%20New%20Disorder%20-%20May%2098/chapter5.html>> (October 2003).
15. M Chachiua, *Internal security in Mozambique: Concerns versus policies*, *African Security Review* 9 (1), 2000, <[http://www.issafrika.org/Pubs/ASR/9No1/%20Security Mozambique.html](http://www.issafrika.org/Pubs/ASR/9No1/%20Security%20Mozambique.html)>, (October 2003).
16. J L Woods, *op.cit.*
17. M Chachiua, *ibid.*
18. M Chachiua, *ibid.*
19. Ministério do Interior, *Plano Estratégico da Polícia da República de Moçambique – PEPRM*, May 2003.
20. *Ibid.* The “normal” ratio would be 1/350 to 1/450 inhabitants.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Op cit.*, paragraph 5.2.1.4.
23. The research team spent one afternoon in a department of the criminal police, where three officers were sharing one pen, having agreed on shifts to use it. This situation did not seem abnormal to them.
24. Personal interview in September 2003.
25. Personal interview in September 2003.
26. Personal interview in September 2003.
27. Personal interview in September 2003.
28. Personal interview in August 2003 reconfirmed by another officer in September 2003.
29. Chapter 1, Article 2, paragraph 2.

30. During the fieldwork from April to September 2003 the research team would ask each security guard we came across how old they were, they been demobilized and had they completed grade 7.
31. Author's own translation.
32. Decree no. 26/90, Chapter VII, Article 20.

CHAPTER 3

IMPLEMENTING THE SADC FIREARMS PROTOCOL

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)¹ adopted a protocol to control the flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the region, the SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials. The main goal of this Protocol is to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related materials, and regulate the import and export of legal small arms.²

Mozambique was signatory to the SADC Protocol in August 2001 and ratified the agreement in September 2002. The implementation of the Protocol however requires steps to be undertaken by several government bodies and coordination of the measures being adopted: national legislation on SALW has to be revised, adapted to regional demands and approved; new institutions may have to be created, while others will need to be developed; coordination mechanisms have to be established and capacity is required to undertake all these steps.

To coordinate and control the implementation of the Protocol the government of Mozambique (GoM) created COPRECAL – *Comissão para a Prevenção e Controlo de Armas Ligeiras* (Committee for the Prevention and Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons).

Mozambique is not new to this type of multi-institutional body – demining activities were co-ordinated in Mozambique first by the *Comissão Nacional de Desminagem* (CND, National Demining Commission) and later by the *Instituto Nacional de Desminagem* (IND, National Demining Institute). There is a wealth of lessons to be learned from these institutions, both for donors and for the GoM: corruption and institutional rivalry led the CND to paralysis, while donor contributions led to the asymmetric growth of the IND vis-à-vis other government bodies. State of the art equipment enables the IND to create, for instance, very accurate maps of priority areas for demining; however, ministries and government agencies do not have the capacity to coordinate donor activities in a way that would enable them to pinpoint exactly which areas, from those suggested by the IND, should be prioritized. As such, demining is still today done in a haphazard way.³

COPRECAL

COPRECAL, currently being set up under the umbrella of the Ministry of Interior, will be the body supervising the implementation of national legislation, international and regional agreements, coordination of research and dissemination of information. It is planned to include members of several government institutions – Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the Armed Forces, Customs and Migration, one academic institution: ISRI – *Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais*, through its CEEI – *Centro de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais*, and two civil society organizations: PROPAZ and Christian Council in Mozambique (CCM) through its project TAE – *Transformação das Armas em Enxadas* (Tools for Arms). Each institution will select its own representatives to the Committee.

The need for a common vision

COPRECAL members participated in a workshop in September 2003 to assess the current situation in Mozambique regarding the small arms issue.⁴ Given the number of institutions involved, the main goal of the workshop was to bring the different stakeholders together and to assess the capacity of the different institutions towards the common goal of controlling small arms. However, during the preparation work it became clear that different institutions had different ideas on what was that common goal. In addition, the statutory rights of COPRECAL are still under discussion at the Council of Ministers and none of the participants had a clear idea of COPRECAL's role or functions.

It soon became clear that the lack of a vision for the security sector in Mozambique posed a major constraint to the control and prevention of small arms proliferation. Overlapping responsibilities, lack of definition in the roles of the different institutions, widespread petty corruption, and lack of clarity regarding the role and scope of COPRECAL were identified as major obstacles to policies and implementation steps. Participants questioned the rationale of investing donor funds in destroying small arms and in measures to control their proliferation, without equal investment in developing the capacity of institutions in the security sector to manage weapons stockpiles in the country.

Participants also expressed concerns regarding the functioning of COPRECAL as a committee composed of representatives from different institutions with

what could be viewed as competitive agendas and unequal capacity. Participants seemed to agree that COPRECAL should undergo a vision and mission exercise before starting any other action. It is hoped that such an exercise will enable the team to overcome institutional competition and thus avoid the paralysis that plagued the now extinct CND. Furthermore, a clear vision should provide the framework for the establishment of priorities and the development of a national approach.

During the workshop, participants discussed the SADC Protocol in detail and verified the following:

- **Legislative Measures** – the current legislation on SALW in Mozambique defines small arms for civilian possession as any weapon up to 9mm calibre. In practice this means that a civilian can legally import a machine-gun into Mozambique. The law does not contemplate homemade weapons either, although it has provisions for the production of homemade ammunition. The revision of legislative measures is currently being debated in the Ministry of Justice, with the participation of several governmental bodies, such as the police, customs, and Ministry of Interior.
- **Operational Capacity** – participants admitted that lack of capacity could become a major constraint to the implementation of the SADC Protocol. Whereas cooperation in terms of capacity-building exercises and joint missions did not pose too much of a problem (although at times language problems prevent those most qualified from participating), the establishment of databases and communication systems could be quite problematic. The current registration systems are unreliable and as much as Mozambicans wish for a computerized system, this may prove to be equally inadequate given the lack of basic infrastructures in many parts of the country.
- **Customs** – Mozambique has 2,700 km of coast and about 4,212 km of landborders, from which police patrol only 717 km. To say that Mozambican borders are porous would be an understatement – not only are there not enough border posts, most of those that exist can barely function. Customs have had great support from donors and improvements have been visible and acknowledged. But customs does not have the resources to perform a thorough job – they have one metal detector, no dogs and insufficient vehicles. Most border posts are quite remote and communications are difficult. Large areas of the land borders are left unpatrolled. The same is true for the vast Mozambican coast. Train

traffic, according to a customs officer, is the most difficult to control. Customs officers know they need better and more equipment in order to be more effective, but again they do their best with what they have. Currently, the Mozambican Customs Office is under pressure from South Africa to keep the border post at Inkomati open 24 hours a day. As much as they appreciate the idea, they have no resources to implement it.

- **Civilian and state-owned firearms** – COPRECAL members were concerned with the way records are currently being kept. The system is manual and too vulnerable to ‘human interference’, as participants put it. There is an urgent need to address this vital part of the Protocol. However, the implementation of a new record system for firearms should be incorporated into a broader framework of security sector reform. COPRECAL also stressed the need to know exactly the quantity and the types of weapons currently stored in legal stockpiles. As for the disposal of firearms, COPRECAL members will have to look into destruction methods and come up with recommendations. The current disarmament initiatives should go on receiving support and should also provide inputs to COPRECAL so that an accurate picture can be formed.
- **Voluntary surrender of firearms, public education and awareness** – COPRECAL members would like to see more community awareness initiatives regarding SALW. The police have been doing some campaigns in the communities, particularly in the areas where they are piloting the community policing programme. They welcome civil society initiatives but the GoM should also become an important player.

Findings

At the end of the workshop, participants had identified the following issues for COPRECAL to address:

The need for a vision exercise: participants acknowledged the need for COPRECAL to develop a vision, thus creating a framework for further action. COPRECAL members stressed the importance of avoiding the situation that plagued the CND and the need for the members representing the different institutions to work as a team. Although COPRECAL is meant to coordinate and control the implementation of the SADC Protocol, its members are quite aware that institutions other than those directly involved will have to be approached and brought into the team.

The gathering of information: none of the participants seemed to know who kept the records on the armament delivered to the government by ONUMOZ. Some participants stressed however the bad condition of most of the equipment that was handed over. COPRECAL members insist it is important to gather information regarding existing small arms in the security forces – not only regarding those handed over by ONUMOZ. As a body meant to centralize and disseminate information, members of COPRECAL feel that such documentation should be made available to them.

Weapons destruction: participants stressed the need to destroy obsolete equipment currently stored in stockpiles. The armed forces are perceived to be overarmed but no one seems to know the exact dimension of the problem. Once information on existing legal stockpiles is gathered there needs to be an assessment of the equipment in terms of type and quantities. This information will enable to compile a list of equipment to destroy and the costs involved. This list can then be included in a proposal for funding.

Small arms and crime: participants acknowledged the common perception that small arms currently being used in crime come from stockpiles under the responsibility of the security forces, rather than from arms caches. However, they questioned the dimension of the problem. Participants suggested a research project on the origin of the small arms currently being used in crime to either dispel or confirm this perception, and also to measure the dimension of the problem.

Marking of small arms: participants stressed the importance of a specific marking system for the several security forces. In order to do this, COPRECAL needs to know whether there is political will to implement such a measure; should political will be there, which are the costs involved and come up with measures preventing the use of such marking by third parties.

Weapons destruction versus inclusion in legal stockpiles: participants claimed that the destruction of weapons in good condition should be questioned in a context, like the Mozambican, where the government possesses obsolete stockpiles which need to be replaced. But they were also aware that such a measure would not be popular neither with donors, nor with the civil society, particularly in an environment where security forces are perceived as incapable to manage the stockpiles under their responsibility. The proposed research on the origin of small arms currently being used in crime may pinpoint problems, but other issues, such as record keeping and corruption, need equally to be addressed.

Record keeping: all the existing security forces have in place a system to register weaponry under their responsibility. This system, however, is quite vulnerable to mistakes and corruption as it depends on handwritten ledgers. Thus, the research on the origin of small arms being used in crime should be complemented with the assessment of the current record keeping system and proposals for improvement, keeping in mind the asymmetric development of infrastructures within Mozambique.

Transparency: participants considered that the current status of the security forces may pose a major hindrance to reform and to donor support to any reform initiative. They stressed the need for more training in transparency measures and for more support to implement such measures. They acknowledged this will be a slow and controversial process, which however should not be dismissed as “impossible to solve”.

Maintenance of existing stockpiles: current stockpiles need to be assessed, but participants considered equally important the assessment of the conditions under which these stockpiles are being stored, due to the eventual danger they may pose to the population. COPRECAL should undertake an inventory of the existing warehouses, their conditions, necessary improvements, and related costs.

Involvement of the private sector: current disarmament initiatives (Operation Rachel and the TAE project) are quite dependent on South African resources and capacity and external donor support. Participants admitted that the current negative image of the armed forces may pose a constraint to direct financing by donors and to direct support by the private sector. However, they also agreed that COPRECAL should make efforts in terms of engaging both donors and the private sector for such initiatives. Participants felt that Mozambique has to show clear signs and will to reform, in order to seek support.

Specific measures against small arms proliferation: participants, although welcoming COPRECAL and support to prevent and control proliferation of small arms, questioned the efficacy of addressing what they considered only a part of a bigger problem. Approaches to small arms should be integrated within a framework of a more comprehensive reform of the security sector in Mozambique.

National legislation: current legislation was considered outdated and in great need of revision. There is a group within the Ministry of Justice drafting a proposal for a new one to be presented to parliament. This group is also looking

at the SADC Protocol in order to incorporate in the proposal changes able to accommodate this international agreement.

International cooperation: participants claimed that international counterparts are not always understanding of current situation in Mozambique. Although willing to comply with the articles of the SADC Protocol, participants stressed the need to further develop national institutions. Participants also mentioned the need to exchange lessons learned with countries in the region which are further ahead with the implementation of the SADC Protocol.

The most obvious trait coming out of this workshop was the great devotion of the participants both to their institutions and to their country. They were honest and straightforward when discussing situations and pinpointing problems. They showed their frustration when their requests meet suspicion from donors, but acknowledged that there are reasons for donors and foreign agencies to show suspicion. Most of all, they wish to be heard and to be supported.

Notes

1. Originally known as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), the organization was formed in Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April 1980, following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration. The Declaration and Treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was signed at the Summit of Heads of State or Government on 17 August 1992, in Windhoek, Namibia. The Treaty commits members to co-operating on politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security. Present member states of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
2. N Stott, "The SADC protocol on the control of firearms, ammunition and other related material", ISS Paper 83, November 2003.
3. Personal interview with a former IDRC/Mine Action Programme project officer.
4. The workshop was funded by the governments of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland as part of the activities of the Arms Management Programme of the ISS.

CHAPTER 4

THE IMPACT OF SMALL ARMS IN COMMUNITIES

Introduction

This chapter is based on the presentation and analysis of an exploratory street survey carried out in the city of Chimoio, northern Mozambique, in April 2003. The original purpose of the survey was to gather basic data on the perception of local communities on security, police performance, and the presence of firearms in Mozambique.

As a pilot study, however, the specific purpose of this research exercise was to pilot the consistency to local realities of the survey, which was developed by the Institute for Security Studies and which has been carried out in other African countries, namely in several regions in South Africa and nationally in Tanzania.

There are several advantages in using surveys previously designed and tested—they have been used and the data analysed and they enable the gathering of similar data, enabling comparative analysis. The danger of using these surveys can be their inadequacy to different socio-economic contexts. It is therefore important to test these surveys with a sample of the target population and adapt them accordingly before starting the actual broader research.

Background

A particular set of circumstances including the proximity to the border with Zimbabwe, its placement along a transport corridor, being in a politically polarized region with a relatively small population made Chimoio the selected location for an exploratory study on security issues in Mozambique.

The province of Manica is crossed by the Beira corridor, which is the main rail and road connection linking the Indian Ocean and the east with the interior of southern and central Africa. It is a fertile agricultural region, producing among others maize, bananas, citrus, and cotton and home to a range of

industries, including textiles, saw mills, processing of cotton and sisal. Relative to the rest of Mozambique, Manica can be considered a prosperous province.

The economic potential of the province and the transport corridor that crosses it turned this region into a region of strategic importance during both conflicts. The province was stage to violent clashes between Frelimo and Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) fighters and the then - Rhodesian and Portuguese armies. Later, the contenders were to be Renamo fighters against soldiers from both Mozambique and independent Zimbabwe.

During the colonial administration, income to Mozambique was provided by labour and transport. If defending the Beira corridor was paramount for the colonial government, Frelimo could not afford not to attack it. The presence of a large settler community in the province was an added bonus. Attacking the region meant not only economic disruption for both the colonial administration and the Rhodesian regime and the infliction of some damage; it showed also the presence of Frelimo soldiers in an area void of external allies. The psychological impact on the settlers was tremendous.

However, given the lack of back up support in the area, Frelimo could not count on their political activists to persuade the population on the justice of their cause. Thus the population was 'compelled' to cooperate with Frelimo, only to be at the receiving end of the Portuguese fury after each Frelimo incursion.

The importance of this corridor was obvious again when, after independence, President Machel threatened to close the Beira corridor to the Rhodesian regime and decided to openly support Zimbabwean ZANU-PF fighters. When dissent with the Mozambican regime started to grow, Rhodesia was quick to provide military and logistic support, which ignited a conflict that would last 16 years. In a kind of poetic justice, from the 1980s on the Beira corridor was being protected by those who tried to disrupt it previously – the then-ZANU fighters, now as Zimbabwean soldiers.

After the independence of Zimbabwe in 1979, Renamo, now without an ally in the region, experienced the same problems Frelimo had experienced during the anti-colonial war and resorted to the same tactics – violence on the population. As a former Renamo soldier told an ISS researcher: "We had to be violent because we had to show the population that the government was unable to protect them, otherwise the population would not believe in us and would not support us."¹

This combination of diverse warring parties – Rhodesian, Portuguese, Mozambican and Zimbabwean soldiers, Frelimo, ZANU-PF and Renamo fighters – in a continuum of nearly three decades of conflict with a high level of violence singles this province out.

Chimoio, being the provincial capital, is a regional administrative, commercial, and transportation centre. Situated along the Beira corridor, Chimoio became central in both conflicts as attested by the huge army barracks still standing in the city.

The social disruption caused by conflict is expressed in the large numbers of refugees both fleeing into neighbouring countries and flocking from rural to urban areas. Chimoio was not an exception to this scenario and the influx of refugees from rural areas brought the city's population to 105,818 in 1991.² Five years after the peace process, the census data of 1997 places the population of Chimoio at 171,056.³

Decades of violent conflict in Mozambique – from the 1960s up to the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992 – facilitated the proliferation of small arms as well as their availability throughout the country.

The little research carried out in Mozambique regarding security issues has focused mainly on Maputo city – the capital of the country. If on one hand it is true that Maputo has higher levels of crime, research based only on Maputo may not be representative of the rest of the country. In post-conflict countries, such as Mozambique, many capital cities tend to grow disproportionately to the rest of the country both in urban and economic terms. The high presence of a relatively large – at least larger than in the rest of the country – expatriate community facilitates the expansion of a service economy catering for it at inflated prices, which can distort the economy. Greater concentration of wealth attracts greater concentration of crime too. Illegal arms caches though are more likely to exist in more rural and less populated areas.

Since the perception has been that urban crime both in South Africa and Mozambique is being committed with illegal small arms from war caches, choosing a location where the presence of such caches is likely to be present seemed to make sense. The historical background of the region only made the choice of Chimoio more obvious.

Methodology

The research team decided to carry out the pilot test with population less used to surveys and also here Chimoio seemed to have an advantage over Maputo.

Random sampling

Due to time and logistic constraints the research team decided to carry out a random street survey in the main markets of Chimoio. The survey team approached people randomly in the market – both stall owners and shoppers – of both genders and with as diversified ages as possible. People were asked questions regarding security issues in their residence areas, provided they lived within the city limits.

The advantage of such random sampling is that it is possible to interview a wide range of people, without running the risk of carrying out what is often called a ‘housewife survey’, as is sometimes the case of house surveys.⁴ As people are being questioned outside their home environment, they are more likely to talk openly as they know they are not being observed by neighbours or relatives. On the other hand, people may be in a hurry to get home and thus be less available to be interviewed, or may also feel intimidated by talking in a public place. To overcome this constraint, people were invited to join the interviewer in a public cafe, replying to the questionnaire over a soft drink.

Limitations of the sample

As the interviews were conducted during the day the risk of targeting only a certain type of population, for instance, only the jobless or students, was minimized by asking security questions regarding not only the respondent, but also including his/her family. As ‘family’ the interviewers defined ‘everybody living under your roof’.

The general reception to the research team was positive. People were cooperative, took their time and some people even waited for their turn to be interviewed.

The research team was able to collect surveys from 34 respondents. Although this sample is enough for a pilot study, any quantitative analysis of such a small

sample has to be regarded with caution and should not be considered as representative of the population.

It is legitimate to say for instance that “3 out of 10 people interviewed in Chimoio have experienced a certain type of crime” but extrapolations such as “one third of the population of Chimoio have experienced the same type of crime” cannot be inferred. Consistencies in the surveys though enable us to draw a picture of the security concerns of the communities and point directions for further studies. Analysis of pilot studies also enable researchers to correct procedures and/or questions for further surveys.

Survey procedures

People were told the purpose of the study, the confidentiality agreement and also that they could stop the interview at any time. All but two respondents completed the questionnaire. The actual answers of these two respondents are included in this report. From the point where they decided to stop the interview, they are included in the ‘no reply’. A third respondent started his interview. By Section 4 he decided to stop and destroyed the questionnaire.

In spite of the good reception to the team, it is obvious from the analysis of the surveys that people are not comfortable replying to questions about firearms and sexual assaults. This issue will be discussed below.

As the survey sample was small, researchers complemented the survey with qualitative data. Interviewers were trained to conduct the interview as a structured interview and to take notes of remarks made by the respondents to the questions.

The survey questions were read aloud to the respondent and the reply was written down by the interviewer. The decision to proceed so is that the census of 1997 recorded an illiteracy rate of 57.7% in Manica Province. Many people are reluctant to admit to illiteracy and would probably refuse to reply to the survey without stating the reason. This could create a wrong perception by the research team as reluctance to participate would not be understood and could be perceived as being related to the sensitivity of the questions. On the other hand, previous research experience in Mozambique has shown that people prefer to reply orally rather than write down their own replies.

The survey included five sections:

- Section 1: individual data on the respondent
- Section 2: crime trends and perceptions of security
- Section 3: security within neighbourhoods
- Section 4: attitudes towards firearms
- Section 5: perceptions on security and firearms

Language

The survey questionnaire (Annex 1) was first translated into Portuguese. It was then discussed with Mozambican nationals to test the pertinence of each question and to adapt any question that needed so.

In Chimoio, the survey questionnaire was then translated into the local languages of Cisena, Cindau, and Shona by the three locally hired interviewers, who also led the interviews. The translation was done orally by the interviewers, so that the concept of words without translation into local languages would have a single meaning, previously clarified and commonly agreed upon.

Section 1: Individual data

The total sample consisted of 34 surveys from 18 male and 16 female respondents. Twenty of the interviews were made in public places, such as cafes; eight interviews were done at the home of the respondent; and six of the interviews were done at the working place of the respondents. The ages of the respondents range from 16 to 70 years of age, giving an average age of 27 years for the sample.

Questions on security were posed in relation to the home area, even for those respondents who had market or street stalls and small businesses in the area of the interview.

All respondents attended or were still attending school and yet most of them are busy in the informal sector. The formal education of the sample goes from completion of grade one to pre-university studies (grade 12), one female was a nurse/birth attendant, another woman an accountant, and two of the

respondents were electricians. Almost half of the respondents (15) have completed schooling between grades 9 and 12.

For analysis purposes, the activities of respondents were divided into five categories: public sector, private sector, informal sector, agriculture, and other:

- Public sector, meaning formal employment with a government institution (three respondents)
- Private sector, defined as legally licensed shops or businesses (eight respondents)
- Informal sector, meaning informal economic activity such as street vending, market stalls and street stalls (14 respondents)
- Agriculture –nearly all respondents practised some kind of agriculture, but mainly for home consumption. None of the respondents had agriculture as a main activity.
- Other – students, housewives and other employment (nine respondents)

Section 2: Perceptions on Crime and Security

This section includes information on types of crimes and victimization during the past 10 years. The time frame of the questions is used as a tool to encourage accuracy in dating a crime and is generally not used in the analysis. Time is usually referenced in relation to a public holiday or event. In this case the research team used the general elections of 1994 for the time reference.

The importance of definitions

Crimes often have a legal definition, which is not always consistent with the public idea of the crime. Concepts such as theft, assault, or robbery are used loosely and deprived of their legal meaning. This becomes particularly important when the surveys have to be translated into another language and social context.

The survey used in this research was translated first from English into Portuguese and then from Portuguese into local languages. In Portuguese, for instance, the

common word used for 'car hijack' and 'car theft' is the same and does not exist in some of the local languages. To overcome this constraint, the research team agreed on common definitions for the crimes listed in the survey.

Thus, the following definitions were used to describe types of crimes mentioned in the survey:

- **'home burglary'** was defined as 'when thieves come, or try to come, into the house independently whether you and/or your family are inside or not'
- **'stock theft'** was defined as 'when someone steals animals, such as sheep, cows, goats, chicken, but not dogs or cats, belonging to you'
- **'crop theft'** was defined as 'when crops get stolen from your farm, be it from the barn or from the field'
- **'car hijack'** was defined as 'when your car is stolen while you are driving it or when you are parked and sitting in it; when you get pushed out and the person runs away with the car' (long but necessary)
- **'car theft'** was defined as 'when your car or parts of your car disappear while you are not present. For instance, during the night, or while parked somewhere'
- **'deliberate damage'** was defined as 'when things belonging to you have been damaged on purpose for no apparent reason'
- **'rural equipment'** was defined as 'not only tractors or mechanized implements, but also hand tools such as hoes, machetes, etc.'
- **'violent assault'** was defined as 'if you were ever beaten up'
- **'robbery'** was defined as 'when you are walking down the street or riding the bus and someone approaches you and threatens you unless you give something; or when you get home and you realize that your wallet is missing'
- **'murder'** was defined as 'when someone was killed by another person on purpose and not by accident'
- **'sexual assault'** was defined as 'not only violent rape, but also when a person has to submit to get the marks at school, for example'

Potential constraints of definitions

Definitions are very important in surveys as they can represent serious constraints during the analysis. In a broader survey, the definition of 'robbery' used here, for instance, would prevent an indicator of violent crime in Chimoio.

Traditionally robbery is defined as 'theft against physical force', that is, robbery is considered only when the theft occurs with either violence or threat of thereof. The definition worked out by the research team though, includes pick pocketing in this category. Were this a broader survey, the results could not be used for comparative analysis with surveys carried out in other countries, due to the different definition.

Whereas in an exploratory survey, given the diminutive size of the sample and the different purpose of the research, this may not pose a problem in terms of analysis, larger surveys have to have carefully drafted definitions. For the purpose of this study these questions were used rather as a test of people's willingness to reply to this type of question and also to test the relevance of these types of crime in the local context.

Credibility of the respondents

Surveys depend on the willingness of people in giving their time and also on the reliability of the respondents. There is always the risk that one of the respondents may not be telling the truth. To overcome this obstacle in bigger samples, the surveys showing replies very different from the median are excluded from the analysis, so that distortions do not occur.

The research team experienced some doubts when analysing the surveys of two male respondents who reported together:

- 3 home burglaries
- 11 crop theft
- 2 assaults
- 2 murders
- 1 rape

As this was an exploratory study no survey was excluded but numbers have to be considered very carefully.

The importance of classification for the analysis

There is another equally important classification for types of crimes, which was not used in this survey: violent crimes and economic crimes. Violent crimes are those where there could have been weapons, such as car hijacking, assault, murder and robbery. This distinction is important as it can represent an indicator of the level of violence.

Observations made during the field work and remarks noted by the researchers created the impression among researchers that violence does not seem to be a common pattern in the criminality of Chimoio. The team had the same impression regarding the use of firearms in crime. People still seem to associate firearms far more to war than to crime. One of the reasons many people stated for not having a gun is that it would not make sense to have one in a country at peace. The association of firearms to crime though is latent in people's minds, as many of them state that if they had a gun they think they would be tempted to use it to solve financial problems, and also that firearms bring instability into the communities.

Questions on sexual assaults

The same disparity can be found regarding the question on sexual assault. Surveys carried out in other places note that it is extremely difficult to get replies to such questions. In a recent survey carried out in central Johannesburg by the ISS,⁵ questions related to sexual crimes were excluded from the survey, due to the reluctance of people in replying to them. The research team in Chimoio faced the same challenge.

While adapting the survey, the research team anticipated this constraint but decided to keep the question on sexual assault because the purpose was to test people's willingness to participate in the survey. Thus, the question remained but the definition of sexual assault was broadened to include sexual favours. After the first day of interviews, the research team decided to modify the question and ask if the respondent knew of anyone in his/her community (and not a family member) who had been raped.

The survey recorded two sexual assaults and one attempted sexual assault. Both victims were relatives of the respondents. Firearms were used in one sexual assault.

To have two actual sexual assaults and one attempt in a sample of 34 seems to suggest that people in Mozambique would be willing to discuss this type of crime. However and again to stress the danger of extrapolating factual data from such small samples, qualitative field observation contradicts this. It was obvious that people felt uncomfortable with the question – they would shift in their seats or immediately say no without pausing.

During a recent interview with a Mozambican psychologist⁶ he was asked about rape and how communities perceived it. According to him, rape seems to be something that most women expect to experience at some time or other during their lives; they do not like it but came to accept it as a fact of life, as an occupational hazard while farming or collecting wood or fetching water. It must be said again that this reflects a personal perception rather than a research finding. Research on sexual crimes although difficult, is important and it is a field that is unexplored in Mozambique. Given the government's efforts to curb domestic violence, research in this field could be useful to inform policies, correct guidelines and design awareness campaigns. As this is a very sensitive topic, research on sexual crimes is usually carried out by experienced psychologists and social workers, who know how to deal with the inflicted trauma.

Crime in Chimoio: Survey results


Chimoio is said to have one of the lowest crime rates in Mozambique for the past five years. According to the PRM in Chimoio, the crime rate in Manica Province is 15 per cent. Although Chimoio has a higher crime level than other urban centres in the province it is still among the safest in Mozambique. And yet, in reviewing the survey results, there appears to be a high number of incidents reported for such a small sample. Half of the respondents reported home burglaries. As respondents in Chimoio did not live in apartment buildings, stealing a bicycle from the house yard, for instance, was counted as home burglary as criminals had to enter the physical premises of the house. Home burglaries and robberies (as defined in the survey) seem so prevalent that people classify them as “being normal”. Shoulders were often shrugged and many respondents replied “of course” as if there were no alternative (Figure 1).

The (under)reporting of crime

Underreporting of crime is common to many countries and societies. Reported crimes are usually those that cannot be concealed or dealt with

otherwise, such as murder, where legal proceedings are needed in order to dispose of the body; those that can be covered by insurance companies, such as car theft or home burglaries; and those too valuable not to report, such as robberies of particular expensive items like jewellery. Petty theft and pilfering are seldom reported to the police.

Future research could profit from a deeper understanding of this problem. This would require a survey with better-defined concepts of crime, with crimes being duly classified in household or individual, violent or economic. This section should also be complemented with detailed questions on the crime reported and on the proceedings, so as to give some insight on areas where police / judiciary services could be improved.



In the reporting of crime, respondents indicated that firearms had been used in primarily in incidents of murder and car hijacking (see Figure 2). Generally, the use of a firearm in crime is very low.

Figure 2 – Use of firearms in crime, 2002





Figure 3 – Types of crime in 2002, by percentage



As indicated in the survey results, burglary is now the most common crime among respondents in Chimoio, followed by robbery, crop and stock theft (Figure 3).

Security

The purpose of section three of the survey was to assess how safe people perceive their communities to be and how people rate police performance. If a neighbourhood is perceived as unsafe it is unlikely that individuals will invest in the area; perception of poor police performance may be decisive when voting.


This is also the reason why it is important for the police to know the dimension of petty crime that is not being reported. A person may not report to the police thefts of small amounts but if these occur repeatedly it is unlikely for the person to feel 'safe' in a neighbourhood.

Official crime statistics cannot include non-reported incidents. Chimoio is one of the Mozambican cities with the lowest reported crime rate and yet respondents to this sample expressed concerns with security. The city of Chimoio was often referred to the research team as a role model for other Mozambican cities and is currently a pilot site for a community policing project. Police efforts to control crime in Chimoio were often referred to and acknowledged by the respondents. If, as this study suggests, crime in Chimoio is not being reported to the police due to its nature, these efforts are probably not being maximized.

Urban and rural population

Although Chimoio is an urban centre, many of its inhabitants have small family farms on the outskirts of town. They do not live there, but they attend the fields regularly and most of the farm stands have a small hut where the owner can stay overnight if necessary. As such, questions were also asked regarding how safe they feel while working at their farm stands. Figure 4 summarizes the degree to which respondents worry about crime.

Figure 4 – Individual concerns about crime



Within the sample, slightly less than half (45%) are occasionally worried about crime. However 52% of respondents are ‘always’ or ‘often’ worried about crime in Chimoio.

Figure 5 - Feeling of security at home and in countryside




Figure 5 presents feelings of safety among respondents at home and in the countryside. More respondents felt 'more or less' safe at home during the day, while respondents generally felt 'very insecure' at night, whether at home or in the countryside.

The perception of the respondents is that most crime happens at night. They referred to the lack of streetlights and lack of night patrols by police as the main factors affecting security in their communities.

Concerns with crime and gender

Crime seems to be an issue that is ever present in respondent's minds. Five female respondents said they worry 'always' about crime and another six female respondents said they worry 'often' about crime. From a sample of 16 women, 11 reported high concerns with the issue.

This could mean that women may feel physically more vulnerable and thus fear crime more than men or they could see themselves as preferential crime targets. But, it could also mean that women perceive that they have fewer rights in the administration of law. In an informal conversation with a police officer from the Domestic Violence Unit in Beira, it was stated that the biggest constraint the unit faced was to convince women to come forward and report violence exerted upon them. Rape victims may decide not to report the incident, as the reporting could bestow a social stigma upon them. All other respondents worry to a certain degree with the level of crime.

Geographical dissemination of crime

The impression from the sample is that crime in Chimoio is not restricted to any particular area or neighbourhood, rather affecting the whole city. Crime statistics provided by the police in Chimoio for the four police stations in Chimoio seem to confirm this (Table 1).

Table 1 – Police statistics for reported crime in Chimoio

	Number of reported crimes 2002	Number of reported crimes 2001
Police station 1	112	115
Police station 2	62	63
Police station 3	42	40
Police station 4	49	45
Total	265	263

Police stations 1 and 2 cover each nine neighbourhoods; police stations 3 and 4 cover seven and eight neighbourhoods respectively.


In terms of neighbourhoods with higher crime levels, Police station 1 covers two and the other stations each cover one neighbourhood with higher levels of crime. These figures, provided by the Central Command of the Police in Chimoio, suggest that crime is relatively widespread rather than concentrated in certain neighbourhoods.

Organized versus economic crime

In a recent focus group discussion carried out with youth in Maputo, the participants made a clear distinction between what they called two types of crimes: organized crime – violent, using firearms, and involving people of financial means; and what was referred to as ‘the crime of ignorance’, described as petty crime committed by people who see no other way forward in their lives. It may involve the occasional use of firearms but the motivation of the criminal is the economic stress of poverty. A similar distinction was equally made by an officer in the Ministry of Interior in Mozambique:

“In Maputo there are two types of crime – organized crime and economic crime. They tend to use the same types of guns, only some organized crime use other tactics, mainly when the criminals are former soldiers (like the murderer of Siba Siba⁷). The former soldiers of *Casa Militar*, who guarantee security to the government, are known to organized crime bosses.”

The attitudes of respondents to changes in crime and violence are shown in Figure 6. The majority of respondents felt that both crime and violence are on the increase, although more noticeably in terms of violence.



The fact that 17 and 14 respondents respectively believe that the levels of violence and crime in their areas has increased is quite remarkable for a country which experienced three decades of violent conflict.


This could be due to the sample, to the lack of definition of violence in the question, and/or to the fact that Mozambicans often state that 'before the war there was no crime'. What seems to be apparent from field observation is that the respondents made a differentiation between violence that occurred during the war and criminal violence. The research team had no access to crime data and as such cannot confirm the accuracy of this statement, but an officer in the Ministry of Interior in Mozambique told the research team that "criminals used the war scenario to commit crimes, but the problem was not general and was 'diluted' due to the war".



Policing in the communities

Policing in Chimoio does not seem to be a problem overall. More than half of the respondents replied they see police on duty at least once a day and a total of 28 respondents see police patrolling their communities once a day to once a week (see Figure 7).

However most respondents complained about the quality of patrols, claiming that it is irregular and generally nonexistent at night.

Respondents felt that police efforts to control crime are 'average' to 'bad', and police performance is rated between 'the same' and 'worse' (Figure 8). Almost equal numbers of respondents stated that police performance had improved in the past few years (n=9) as stated that it had worsened (n=7) (Figure 9).





Police performance

The reasons presented by respondents for the change or lack of change in police performance were similar among respondents and were used both to justify the improving and the worsening of police performance. Selected reasons given by respondents follow, each respondent was asked to give up to three reasons:

- **salaries** for policemen (n=8) – low salaries viewed as a reason for poor performance and an increase in salaries explained improvements;
- lack of or inefficient **patrolling** of the community (n=7);
- presence (or the lack of) **street lights** to security in communities (n=6);
- security improved in neighbourhoods due to **better police performance** (n=6);
- **cooperation of policemen with criminals** deteriorates the security in their area (n=5);
- **cooperation, or lack of, with the community** was also referred to as a reason of change in the public security (n=5);
- **corruption** was identified as a deteriorating factor in public security (n=5);
- **poverty level** of police officers (n=3);
- **other reasons** included: faster reaction by the police; reduction of crime in the area; lack of police ethics; awareness campaigns; good patrolling; vigilantes; honesty of some policemen; bad training and lack of resources for the police.

Factors influencing police performance

The consistency detected in the replies of the sample seems to identify three main factors that affect police performance: economic reasons, corruption and cooperation with the community. Thus, the replies of the sample were clustered into three categories: cooperation with the community, including all the replies that mention cooperation, or lack of, with the community as an important reason for change; economic reasons, including replies mentioning salaries and levels of poverty; and corruption, which includes the replies mentioning cooperation with criminals, lack of ethics, and bribery.

Out of 60 suggestions, more than half (33) fall under these three clusters:

Table 2 – Factors influencing police performance	
Cluster	Number
Cooperation with the community	9
Economic reasons	13
Corruption	11
Total	33

Respondents seemed to perceive these three problems as key factors in public security: living conditions need to be improved; police and community have to cooperate; and corruption has to stop. Respondents seemed to relate corruption in the police force to poverty.

Security in the community

One of the major constraints in community-based projects to control crime and firearms is the difficulty in encouraging people to report on their neighbours. If popular attitude towards corrupt officials is one of understanding and empathy, the denouncing of corrupt officials can become very hard. Respondents do not like corruption and complain about it but it seems that they have largely come to accept it as largely inevitable.

Communities who perceive themselves as insecure tend to assume responsibility for their own security, not always in the best of ways. Mozambique is not alien to popular justice – around 1994 in Chipamanine, the biggest market in Maputo, if the population caught a thief he would be executed on the spot. The research team got the clear impression that there may be some vigilante-type movements in the neighbourhoods of Chimoio, primarily through references to ‘popular defence’.

Youth and demobilized soldiers

Reports written by organizations involved in the reintegration of former combatants hint that in fact, and contradicting common wisdom, ex-combatants are not more prone to crime than any other group.⁸

However, an interview with an officer in the Ministry of Interior indicated that most criminals are middle aged, demobilized soldiers and unemployed. According to this officer, demobilized soldiers prefer to say that they are unemployed rather than former soldiers or former *Casa Militar*.

The streets of Mozambican cities are crowded with young people trying to fend for themselves. Most of these people have some degree of formal education but find it difficult to enter the job market. Youth is traditionally looked upon suspiciously for varied reasons.

Community protection

Regarding the question on what are respondents doing to protect the community against crime, responses varied between individual response (installing burglar bars or buying a dog) to more community-focused approaches, including attending community police meetings. Table 3 summarizes the replies to this question.

Table 3 – Actions to prevent crime	
What are you doing to prevent crime in your area*	Number
Installed burglar bars	14
Nothing	14
Denounce criminals to community authorities	9
Got a dog	7
Denounce criminals to local authorities	6
Joined local policing initiatives (vigilantes)	6
Denounce criminals to the to police	5
Attend meetings of community police	4
Joined a self defense unit	2
No reply	1
Rent a room	1
Hired security	1
Joined street patrols	0
Installed an alarm system	0
Got a gun	0
*Respondents could identify more than one type of action	

Private initiatives to prevent crime seem to prevail. Even those respondents who replied ‘nothing’ justified the answer with lack of financial resources to install an alarm or burglar bars.

This could mean that people are not relying on authorities to prevent crime in their areas. This can also be due to the nature of crime being committed in the community. As stated above, it may be crime that is often unreported.

Community alternatives to public security

According to information from the police in Chimoio, there have been no reports of vigilantism or self defence units in the area. Police stated that communities have been contributing in a positive way to preventing crime and welcome this contribution.

According to the survey respondents, there is also a will among the population to cooperate with the police. The police in Chimoio have been organizing talks and awareness campaigns in the communities, which were mentioned by respondents.

An interesting observation is that respondents seem more prone to denounce criminals to the community authorities (defined as the community informal leader) first; to the local authorities (defined as the secretary of the neighbourhood or government representative) second and finally to the police.

This could mean several things and may deserve further research. It could be that communities prefer to respond themselves to petty crime and only go to the police in certain instances or signal a lack of trust in the institution.

Cooperation with the community

Chimoio is currently testing a community policing pilot project in the neighbourhood of Fepom. None of the respondents of the sample came from this part of town. However according to the police in Chimoio, this project is being implemented with the support of community leaders.

The last question of this section asked respondents what they think the government of Mozambique could do to improve the security in their communities. It was an open question however most respondents refer to providing street lights, creation of employment, better salaries, improving police resources, and better patrolling as actions the government could take to improve public security. Again it seems that respondents make a clear link between structural problems and crime. It also seems that respondents respect the police as an institution, as most replies emphasized stronger cooperation with the communities and many ask for stronger ties and more awareness campaigns.

Attitudes towards Firearms

The purpose of the fourth section of the survey was to research popular attitudes towards firearms; whether firearms are important in the local culture and also how they are being used. Knowing popular attitudes towards firearms enables governments to draft policies and to design specific and targeted awareness campaigns.

In the case of this study, the main purpose was to verify how willing people would be to answering questions related to firearms.


During previous meetings with organizations collecting firearms, such as TAE, the research team was told that this was a sensitive topic. It was no different in Chimoio. It was obvious that people were uncomfortable replying to questions about weapons. Respondents had to be encouraged to reply with answers other than 'I don't know'.

Although respondents were reluctant in replying to questions such as "If you need a gun do you have easy access to one" (question 4.7), they were less reluctant when questioned regarding their own attitude towards firearms. Respondents did not hesitate in saying why they would like, or not, to have a gun.


Question 4.12 "What would you recommend to reduce weapon availability in your community" presented two clear responses: give police more power and promote more weapons collection programmes. Respondents were then asked whether they agreed or not with any of the alternatives and also if they would like to add any other type of initiative. Almost all respondents added their own proposals to control weapons. It seems that reluctance on this subject is linked to the nature of the questions and can be overcome, so further research on this issue should not be deterred from including these questions.

During this section, respondents would often look around to make sure no one was listening to them before they would venture a reply.

The first set of questions inquires on how often weapons are used in crime in the community, how often the respondent hears gunshots in his community, and if compared to previous years the availability of weapons has changed. The majority of the respondents (n=21) says that firearms are used 'sometimes' and 'seldomly' to commit crimes in their communities, and half of the sample (n=17) replied that firearms were used 'seldom' and 'never' (see Figure 10). This seems to confirm the pattern of firearms use noted earlier the survey, where most crime incidents did not involve the use of firearms.

Figure 10 – Frequency of firearms used in crime


The same can be said regarding the next question on the frequency of gunshots in the community. The majority ($n=27$) reported hearing gunshots 'sometimes' ($n=18$) and 'seldom' ($n=9$) whereas 13 respondents fall reported 'seldom' and 'never' ($n=4$). These figures are also consistent with the impression the team had on the field that firearms may not yet represent a problem in crime in the area.



A clear majority of respondents ($n=21$) stated that the availability of firearms has decreased (Figure 11). However, approximately one-third of the sample saw no change or an increase in weapons.

Respondents were asked what they viewed as the main reason for the change in weapons availability. A summary of responses is presented in Figure 12. It should be noted that the responses could refer to either an increase or decrease in the number of available weapons and respondents could give more than one answer.

Figure 12 – Main reason for weapons availability



War and the availability of firearms

The majority of the respondents who recorded a reduction in the availability of weapons seemed to attribute the reduction in weapons mainly to war-related events: arms collection programmes, demobilization, end of the war and awareness campaigns. Eight respondents make a link between firearms and crime and attribute the reduction to police efforts, with and without the support of the community.

The respondents who think that the availability of weapons has increased (n=8) attribute the change to the fact that the collected weapons are in the wrong hands and/or the police are unable to control the situation. Enquiries as to what respondents meant by the term 'wrong hands' they were quite blunt and explained to the team that army and police officers were renting to criminals either their own weapons or weapons collected after the war. One of the respondents attributed the decrease in weapons to the fact that "many policemen were fired because they had sold or rented out their guns to criminals".

The origin of firearms

The original idea of the research team was to verify if remains of war still in arms caches were perceived as being used in crime. According to eight of the respondents it is rather weapons already collected that are being used in crime. According to an officer of the Ministry of Interior in Mozambique, weapons used currently in urban crime are either being rented out by legal owners or have been hidden in arms caches, which seems to concur with the statements of the respondents.

Access to firearms

The next questions were more personal and tried to establish how respondents relate to firearms as individuals. Respondents are asked if s/he knows any friend or relative who owns a firearm; if that person has a gun license; if the respondent has access to a firearm should it be necessary; and if the respondent would like to possess a gun. The questions were complemented with an open ended question that asked respondents to state the reason why s/he would like, or not, to own a gun.

Most respondents stated that they did not have friends or relatives who were gun owners. No respondent seemed comfortable replying to this set of questions. The majority of respondents said they did not have access to a firearm and would not to be willing to have one.

Only two respondents said they have easy access to a firearm, which is interesting because both stated that they did not know anyone with a gun.

This seems to suggest that there is not a culture of weapons in Mozambique. Respondents did not seem to think of weapons as something one should have, but rather as something that is not quite honourable or right. It seems that there is an association between weapons, war and social disturbance. The team was surprised that no respondent made the association of firearms to hunting, as had been expected.

Reasons for owning a firearms

Those respondents stating that they would like to possess a firearm justify the wish with security reasons. The reasons given by respondents who did not want a firearm fit into three clusters:

- having a weapon in a time of peace does not make sense
- afraid of having and handling a firearm
- fear they might use the gun

Fourteen respondents attributed their wish of not having a gun to either considering that guns bring violence into the community or because they are afraid they may be tempted to use the gun.

It seems that respondents in this sample feel that weapons can have an impact on one's behaviour and sense of self. Some respondents said that weapons "bring disobedience" and they were asked to explain what they meant. According to them, if you have a weapon you feel empowered to do more of what you want and less of what you have to. It is easier to disobey the norm.

Another respondent replied with a parable about lions and lambs that you cannot change nature of things and guns are meant to kill.

Controlling firearms

The next set of questions focus on gun control and inquires respondents how they feel about gun control measures in his/her community. The first two questions ask the respondent's opinion on whether gun control should be improved and if respondents would be willing to encourage people in handing over their guns, should security in their communities improve (Table 4).

Table 4 – Attitudes to controls on firearms				
Question	Yes	No	Don't know	No reply
Do you think gun control in your area needs to be improved?	29	2	2	1
Question	Yes	No	Don't know	No reply
If security in your area improves will you encourage people to hand in weapons?	3	2	1	1

Communities and disarmament efforts

Overall respondents expressed a willingness to support efforts to disarm communities. A majority of respondents thought that gun control needs to be improved and were willing to contribute to disarmament efforts. If future research confirms this trend, the government of Mozambique seems to be in a very comfortable position to strengthen gun control efforts.

Respondents were given two recommendations on improving controls on firearms in their community. Respondents were asked which they would prefer and also if they would like to add additional recommendations. Table 5 presents the replies.

Table 5 – Recommendations to improve controls on firearms	
Recommendation	Respondents*
Give the police more power to apprehend illegal weapons	22
Promote more weapons collection programmes	13
No reply	9
* Respondents could choose both recommendations	

Most respondents support giving the police more power to control illegal weapons. The other suggestions made by respondents are in line with previously given answers. These include more coordination between the police and communities and promoting greater awareness. Respondents also referred to the structural problems of poverty and also the need for improvements in police working conditions.

Respondents were asked their opinion on the sources for illegal weapons both within Mozambique and externally. Most respondents (n=20) stated that the weapons in the community were remnants of the war. However these are not necessarily weapons that remain in arms caches. In some instances, the respondents specifically identified weapons that were seized during the ONUMOZ operation but were not destroyed at the time.

Perceptions on security and firearms


The final section of the survey explored the link between firearms and security and asked respondents questions on crime, firearms and weapons collection programmes.

Respondents were asked to identify what they believed to be some of the motivations for crime in Chimoio. Their replies are summarized in Table 6. Respondents were able to indicate more than one reason.

Reason	Number
Unemployment	20
Poverty	17
Easy living	8
No reply	6
Drug use	5
Poor education	5
Personal frustrations	4
Difficult living conditions	3
Exclusion	1
Frustrated youth	1
Hatred	1
Lack of tolerance	1
Drug use	1
Alcohol	1
Idleness	1
Lack of street lights	1
Lack of safe housing	1


Most respondents attribute crime to structural problems (unemployment, poverty and difficult living conditions).

Respondents were then asked a series of questions related to firearms that are most common in their area. The purpose of these questions was to establish a pattern, if any, of the presence of weapons in each community and identify a possible link to the crime situation.




Respondents stated that there were more automatic weapons than hand guns in the community (Figure 13). No respondent mentioned shotguns or rifles, even though Manica Province is a region where hunting was common before the war. The majority of respondents (75 per cent) stated that the presence of firearms worsens crime in the community (Figure 14).

Figure 14 – Do firearms negatively affect crime in the community?




The two questions on how frequently firearms are being used compared to before and after the elections, respondents seem to be consistent in a less frequent use of firearms (Figure 15).

Figure 15 – Change in availability of firearms



Post-war disarmament efforts

Respondents were asked where they thought weapons were turned in after the GPA (Figure 16). The majority of the respondents said that the firearms handed over by militia were delivered to the military barracks, apparently the appropriate procedure.



None of the respondents had participated in firearms collection efforts although thirteen of the respondents were old enough to have been either soldiers or militia. The survey did not include a direct question on whether the respondent had or not been part of a militia group. No respondent admitted having belonged to a militia group; on the contrary, some would state they had not been in the militia.

Respondents were asked why they thought some militia did not want to hand over their firearms after the war. Eleven respondents did not reply to the question or said they did not know and one refused to reply to further questions. The most frequent reason attributed to some militia to keep their firearms were fear of renewed war, for protection, and not knowing where to deliver them.

Respondents were visibly uncomfortable with the subsequent questions on arms caches and many respondents would take care in stressing that they did not know of any cache around their community; or that they had never found one. The majority of the sample denied both the presence of arms caches in their communities (n=24) and participation in finding them (n=19). Some of the respondents had heard of both Operation Rachel and the CCM TAE programme.

Regarding the question about how communities identify arms caches, nearly all respondents replied the same: arms caches were found when refugees started to resettle and had to open farm land, or while gathering construction materials for their houses.

Given the existence of two successful firearms collecting programmes in Mozambique – Operation Rachel and TAE, the survey included questions on both these projects. Although most respondents stated that their community had not cooperated with either initiative, seventeen respondents would provide information on arms caches to TAE, while 18 would provide information to the police.

Lessons learned and recommendations for further research

The most important finding of this survey was the commitment of the respondents to completing the survey, even when the questions started to become uncomfortable. People showed reluctance in replying to some questions and it is doubtful that they have been candid with some of the replies, but this should not deter further research exercises.

The main finding of this survey is that this type of research is possible in Mozambique – people understand the questions and, in spite of some reluctance, people do reply and participate. Many respondents at the end of the survey told the interviewers how much they had liked to be interviewed and would the team please pass the concerns of the population to those who could respond.

However this chapter also raises several issues for further research and suggests some recommendations.

Research in Mozambique should preferably be extended to at least one province outside Maputo province. As stated earlier, research based only on the capital city may present trends and patterns not common to the rest of the county. One

of the main purposes of research is to provide institutions with information that can help draft and implement policies and strategies. As such, data gathered in Maputo should be cross-checked with data gathered at provincial level.

There is a need to know exactly which type of crime is being committed in these communities and the extent of under-reporting. Statistics which do not include these two dimensions of the crime problem may be presenting a distorted image of the situation. Policies and strategies based on this distorted image may become difficult to implement or not ripe the expected benefits. This can lead to further frustration both in the population that does not experience improvements, and in the police force, who do not see their efforts rewarded, no matter what they do.

This report suggests that there may be a link between structural problems and crime in Mozambique. Understanding the motivations of crime is important to draft policies and to allocate resources. It may also point to situations that require a more global approach, involving resources and strategies from more than one ministry. Crime and security should not be dissociated from the existing social and economic environment and crime control measures can also come from quarters other than the police or the Ministry of Interior.

Some circumstances seem to be particular to Mozambique and should be taken into consideration when designing further research projects. When defining the sample population, care should be given to the fact that some Mozambican households are headed by children or youth. Questions including comparisons should include a reference in either size, quantity or time. Concepts such as crime types, violence and crime should be carefully defined, taking into consideration the decades of historical violence.

Another perception that emerged in this survey is the suspicion of corruption within the police. This is not new and the Ministry of Interior is aware of the perceptions. Many efforts have been made in Mozambique to curb corruption and many institutions show visible signs of improvement.

None of these problems is new in Mozambique neither are they unique to the country. Governments all over the world have faced or are still facing similar problems.

More than anything, this small survey illustrated how research can provide information that can be formulated into policies and approaches by governments. The Ministry of Interior recognizes the importance of research

and it can benefit from engaging with others in additional research on research proposals on fields of particular relevance for the Ministry to aid it in its work.

Notes

1. Personal interview.
2. Source: website of INE.
3. Source: website of INE.
4. House surveys carried out during office hours, for instance, run the risk of interviewing mostly housewives, as they are the most likely to be home during normal business hours.
5. T Legget, *Rainbow Tenement, Crime and Policing in Inner Johannesburg*, ISS, Monograph 78, 2003.
6. Personal interview on 11.2.2003 in Maputo.
7. The firearm used to murder Carlos Cardoso has never been found and it is suspected it may belong to the police stockpiles.
8. See the most recent report published by PROPAZ, a Mozambican NGO that deals with the social re-integration of former combatants. Alex Vines, in op.ci also refers to the fact that demobilized soldiers are not more involved in crime than other social groups. Interviews with many Mozambicans expressed the same view.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The fact that this monograph has been written is testimony to the political will for reform existing among the ranks of the security forces in Mozambique. Officers interviewed have to deal on a daily basis with the frustrations of problems they feel impotent to solve. They are ready to cooperate and to implement reforms; they are only waiting for a sign from the higher levels of political command.

Mozambique's development, in the post-independence period has been constrained by human insecurity – first with the civil war and then with the proliferation of small arms after the peace agreement. The recent natural catastrophes, such as the floods in 2000 and 2001, exposed the dependence on regional resources and showed the vulnerability and lack of resources of the security sector to cope with them. But it did have an advantage – it showed Mozambicans what a positive role a professional, accountable, and independent security sector can play. It established a basis upon which to build a positive image for the security sector. The perception Mozambicans have of their security forces is rather poor, as replies to the survey (Chapter 4) seem to suggest. And yet, Mozambicans are willing to support improvements in the security sector and show appreciation for the measures undertaken so far in this regard.

Post-independence challenges

The hardest challenges for Frelimo after independence were to build a nation out of patched chieftancies with dubious historical relations, to create a national identity among peoples with different languages and few cultural traits in common and to assert national sovereignty in a hostile regional environment. These issues were inextricable from the dynamics of the civil war and would later frame the strategies of Frelimo during the peace process. Frelimo was the ruling party in Mozambique at the time of the General Peace Agreement, coming from a background of single party rule. This created an environment where party interests and state interests were not discernable.

Frelimo sponsored the shift to a multiparty system but it seems to have been unable to internalize that shift. This is a situation that both the Frelimo party and the government of Mozambique may wish to address and correct. During the ONUMOZ period, party politics and strategies seem to have taken priority over national interests and this has been a relatively constant pattern. Frelimo's policy regarding national identity has always been one of inclusion/exclusion, but within the framework of the party – the interest of the party was also the interest of the nation. Mozambique suffered the consequences when hostile regimes tapped on the discontent and disenfranchisement created by such an attitude.

In a multi-party setting, such an attitude runs the risk of alienating segments of the population. Furthermore, this attitude can ultimately cause problems at national level, which may be difficult for any government to correct. This seems to be what happened in the security sector during the ONUMOZ mission.

Unequal donor support

Perceived as a less political body than the armed forces, the police were able to get support from a number of donors, ranging from technical assistance, to provision of equipment, to capacity building. The benefits from this support are evident and much has been accomplished. Most Mozambicans acknowledge a noticeable shift in police attitudes towards the population. However, both the government of Mozambique and donors should reflect on the validity of such support when it is not integrated into a broader reform strategy that includes all the security sector agencies in the country.

If it was acceptable in 1994 to postpone any reform of the security sector, today, ten years into the peace process, this is no longer the case. Traditionally, the security sector is not recognized as a partner in the struggle against poverty. However, given the impact that a poorly functioning security sector can have on sustainable development and poverty alleviation, more agencies and development workers are shifting their attention to security issues. Lack of public security means lack of investment and loss of property; it means diverting scarce resources from other sectors to allocate them in alleviating an impossible situation; it means unequal development. There is no point in supporting the destruction of SALW in Mozambique if the government is unable to stop their supply.

Mozambique has two ongoing disarmament initiatives – Operation Rachel and the Tools for Arms project, which have been very successful and deserve continuing support from the international community. However, efforts to address regional security cannot be reduced to these two programmes and a few ad hoc initiatives involving the police or the army. Mozambique deserves a modern and professional security sector, able to guarantee the security of the national territory and the security of Mozambican citizens. It is in the hands of the GoM to show political will to do so and it is in the capacity of the international community to support that political will.

The government faces a difficult challenge – the perceived corruption within government structures, including the security sector. Corruption was a theme that emerged over and over again during interviews, group discussions and workshops. Mozambicans feel, rightly so, that they have been too much in the limelight regarding corruption. As one of the interviewees told the team: “It seems there are no other corrupt countries in the world. It seems we are the only ones suffering with corruption” and it is true that a couple of high-profile court cases, closely monitored by the local and international media, have brought Mozambique and the problem of corruption to the forefront.

This perception that institutions are vulnerable to corruption will most certainly impact on how the international community perceives the commitment of the government in implementing effective reform within the security sector. To dispel such perception the government may need to be willing to make compromises. Participants at the workshop (Chapter 3) suggested that the government present donors with requests for assistance, showing a greater willingness to discuss difficult issues, such as corruption. They also suggested that governmental institutions should be more accurate and less ambitious with the proposals they make to donors.

Regarding small arms, the government of Mozambique seems to be in a particular advantage – people seem not only supportive of any measure to control the presence of firearms, but also willing to contribute to such efforts. Plus, it seems that there is not yet a widespread culture of weapons in Mozambique.

The present situation seems ideal to raise public awareness in Mozambique regarding the threat of small arms and light weapons. People seem to be supportive of any such initiative and many of the respondents in the survey referred to the need for more awareness campaigns. It would also send a signal to the communities of the commitment of the government to control the availability of small arms, which communities perceive as a threat to their security.

Operations to reduce illegal firearms have been ongoing in Mozambique and the Ministry of Interior may wish to intensify such operations, given the apparent support of the population. Notwithstanding, the Ministry of Interior should also address the existing stockpiles, as they seem to be having an impact on public security.

Further research on small arms and light weapons in Mozambique is clearly required to assist in policy formulation. COPRECAL, as a co-ordinating body, should identify research areas and research partners. Such research is possible and data gathered can be used to monitor the success of the different interventions; to correct policies or interventions; to allocate funds; to pinpoint particular problem areas. Field research has the added bonus that communities feel they are being heard.

Internationally, Mozambique is recognized as one of the leading African states in controlling and preventing the availability of small arms and light weapons. Internally the government seems to enjoy the support of the population. Mozambique has now assumed the Presidency of the African Union; local elections in 2003 will be followed by general elections in 2004. Both the Mozambican population and the international community appear supportive of efforts to prevent and control illegal firearms. Mozambique's contribution to these efforts are well documented and both SALW collection programmes currently ongoing in Mozambique have been consistently praised as highly successful programmes.

Donor support for initiatives to control and prevent the availability of small arms and light weapons seems to be growing internationally and Mozambique is very well placed to benefit from this support.

Annex I: Survey Questionnaire

1	Individual Survey	
1.1	Questionnaire Number	
1.2	Name of Interviewer	
1.3	Date of interview dd/mm/yyyy	
1.4	Place of interview	
1.5	Setting of interview 1 = public place 2 = in homestead 3 = business	
1.6	Name of the Respondent (optional)	
1.7	Sex of the Respondent 1 = male 2 = female	
1.8	Age of Respondent (enter year of birth)	
1.9	Area of Residence	
1.10	Education (enter only completed grades)	
1.11	Type of business 1 = shop; 2 = market stall; 3 = street stall; 4 = hawker; 5 = tradesmen (auto workshop, carpentry, etc)	
1.12	Profession / Income generation activities 1 = public sector; 2 = private sector; 3 = informal sector; 4 = farming; 5 = other	

2		Crime Trends and Perceptions of Security											
<i>Over the past ten years have you or your family experienced any of the following crimes (only family home)</i> yes 1 = no 2 =		No. of times in 2002				No. of times after the elections (1994)				No. of times before the elections (1994)			
		Actual	Firearm used	Attempt	Firearm used	Actual	Firearm used	Attempt	Firearm used	Actual	Firearm used	Attempt	Firearm used
2.1 Home burglary													
2.2 Stock Theft													
2.3 Crop Theft													
2.4 Hijacking of Vehicle													
2.5 Theft of Vehicle													
2.6 Deliberate Damage or Destruction of Property													
2.7 Farm Equipment													
2.8 Assault if you were beaten-up													
2.9 Robbery if you were robbed													
2.10 Murder only among household members													
2.11 Sexual Assault both actual and attempted rape													

3	Security Trends	
3.1	Is the issue of crime one that worries you.... 1 = all the time; 2 = very often; 3 = from time to time; 4 = seldom; 5 = never	
3.2	How safe do you feel walking in your residential area during the day? 1 = very safe; 2 = fairly safe; 3 = average; 4 = bit unsafe; 5 = very unsafe	
3.3	How safe do you feel walking in your residential area after dark? 1 = very safe; 2 = fairly safe; 3 = average; 4 = bit unsafe; 5 = very unsafe	
3.4	How safe do you feel walking in your fields/ collecting wood/water during the day ? 1 = very safe; 2 = fairly safe; 3 = average; 4 = bit unsafe; 5 = very unsafe	
3.5	How safe do you feel walking in your fields/ collecting wood/water after dark ? 1 = very safe; 2 = fairly safe; 3 = average; 4 = bit unsafe; 5 = very unsafe	
3.6	Compared to previous years, do you think the level of violence in your area has: 1 = increased; 2 = stayed the same; 3 = decreased	
3.7	Compared to previous years, do you think the level of crime in your area has: 1 = increased; 2 = stayed the same; 3 = decreased	
3.8	How often do you see a police officer on duty in your village? 1 = at least once a day; 2 = at least once a week; 3 = at least once a month; 4 = less than once a month; 5 = never	
3.9	Do you think the police in your area are doing a good job at controlling crime? 1 = yes, a very good job; 2 = yes, a good job; 3 = an average job; 4 = no, a poor job; 5 = no, a very poor job	
3.10	Compared to previous years, do you feel the police service in your area are getting: 1 = very much better; 2 = better; 3 = the same; 4 = worse; 5 = very much worse	

3.11	What do you think caused the police service to change, or not to change at all? (record no more than 3)		
3.12	If the police are not protecting your community, who is guaranteeing security in your neighbourhood?		
3.13	Do you think crime in your area is committed by: 1 = people from outside the area; 2 = people from this area; 3 = both; 4 = youth , 5 = ex-combatants; 6 = don't know		
3.14	Are there any gangs in your area? 1 = yes; 2 = no; 3 = don't know		
3.15	How strong are the gangs in your area? 1 = very strong; 2 = strong; 3 = average; 4 = weak; 5 = very weak		
3.16	What <u>one</u> type of crime are you <u>most scared</u> of in your area? 1 = house breaking 2 = rape 3 = murder 4 = child abuse 5 = stock theft 6 = mugging 7 = car-jacking 8 = drug related crime 9 = gang crime 10 = theft 11 = assault 12 = fighting 13 = armed robbery 14 = not a lot of crime 15 = other (specify)		
3.17	What have you or a member of your family personally done to prevent crime in your community? 1 = yes 2 = no		
	3.17.1 Joined street patrols		3.17.9 Installed a burglar alarm system
	3.17.2 Report crime/ criminals to the police		3.17.10 Rented a room to someone
	3.17.3 Report crime/ criminals to local councillors		3.17.11 Hired a security company
	3.17.4 Report crime/ criminals to community/ street committee		3.17.12 Got a gun
	3.17.5 Participate in community police fora		3.17.13 Got a dog
	3.17.6 Participate in self-defence units		3.17.14 Nothing

	3.17.7 Installed burglar bars in the house		3.17.15 Other specify:
	3.17.8 Local policing initiative		
3.18	<p>What <i>one</i> type of crime is most common in your area? Circle only one answer</p> <p>1 = house breaking 6 = mugging 11 = assault 2 = rape 7 = car-jacking 12 = faction fighting 3 = murder 8 = drug related crime 13 = armed robbery 4 = child abuse 9 = gang related crime 14 = not a lot of crime 5 = stock theft 10 = theft 15 = Other (specify)</p>		
3.19	<p>What forms of protection do you use to protect your house?</p> <p>1 = refuses to answer 9 = burglar alarm 2 = security guard 10 = community patrols 3 = dog 11 = traditional methods 4 = natural barrier (wood, bushes) 12 = special window/door grilles 5 = axe / stick / club 13 = razor wire/broken bottles 6 = armed response 14 = gun 7 = special door locks 15 = other (specify) 8 = high fence/wall</p>		
3.20	<p>What do you think the government can do to improve the crime situation of your community?</p>		

4	Trends and Attitudes to Firearms	
4.1	How often are firearms used in your community to commit crimes? <i>1 = all the time; 2 = often; 3 = sometimes; 4 = seldom; 5 = never</i>	
4.2	How often do you hear gunshots in your community? <i>1 = all the time; 2 = often; 3 = sometimes; 4 = seldom; 5 = never</i>	
4.3	Compared to previous years, the number of firearms has: <i>1 = increased; 2 = no change; 3 = decreased</i>	
4.4	What do you think is the main reason for the change in the number of guns?	
4.5	Do you know of a close friend or a family member who has a gun? <i>1 = yes 2 = no 3 = don't know 4 = refused to answer</i>	
4.6	Do you know if the gun is licensed? <i>1 = yes 2 = no 3 = probably yes 4 = probably no</i>	
4.7	Do you have easy access to a gun, if you need one? <i>1 = yes 2 = no 3 = don't know 4 = refused to answer</i>	
4.8	Would you personally own a gun? <i>1 = yes 2 = no 3 = don't know 4 = refused to answer</i>	
4.9	What is the one main reason you would or would not own a gun?	
4.10	Do you think there is a need for improved control over the number of guns in your area? <i>1 = yes 2 = no 3 = don't know 4 = refused to answer</i>	
4.11	If the security in your community improved, would you consider encouraging people to stop owning guns? <i>1 = yes 2 = no 3 = don't know 4 = refused to answer</i>	
4.12	What would you recommend to control the use of guns or reduce the need for guns in your community? <i>1 = giving the police more powers to seize illegal guns 2 = holding more weapons collection programmes 3 4 5</i>	
4.13	If there are illegal firearms in the area, where do you think they come from? <i>1 = leftovers from the war; 2 = South Africa; 3 = Swaziland; 4 = Zambia; 5 = other countries (specify)</i>	

4.14	Are firearms important in your community and why? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	
4.15	When there is an argument in your community, who do you approach first to help solve it?	
4.16	How are disputes solved within your community?	
4.17	How are disputes with people outside of your community solved?	
4.18	Is there a police post in your community? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	
4.19	How far is the nearest police post? (<i>distance in walking hours</i>)	

5	Perceptions on Security and Firearms	
5.1	Do you think the crime situation has changed in the past 5 years? <i>1 = yes 2 = no 3 = don't know</i>	
5.2	How would compare the crime situation today with the crime situation before the war? <i>1 = better 2 = no change 3 = worse</i>	
5.3	Who do you think uses more easily firearms? <i>1 = the police 2 = the criminals</i>	
5.4	Why do you think crimes are being committed in your community? (record 3 responses)	
5.5	What is the type of guns more common in your community? <i>1 = pistols 2 = automatic (AK47) 3 = rifles</i>	
5.6	Do you think the presence of guns makes the crime situation worse? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	
5.7	Compared to 1997 do you think today guns are being used: <i>1 = more often 2 = no change 3 = less often</i>	
5.8	Compared to 1993 do you think today guns are being used: <i>1 = more often 2 = no change 3 = less often</i>	
5.9	During the war in your community were there civilians armed and trained to protect the community? <i>1 = many civilians 2 = only a few 3 = no civilians</i>	
5.10	During the war did people volunteer to defend the communities? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	
5.11	After the war, did civilians in your community hand over freely their weapons? <i>1 = they all did; 2 = the majority did; 3 = only a few did; 4 = none did; 5 = don't know</i>	
5.12	Where did the handed over weapons go?	
5.13	Did you participate in any efforts to collect and hand over weapons? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	

5.14	Why do you think some people keep their weapons?	
5.15	Do you think that crime today is being committed with those weapons? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	
5.16	If so, how did criminals get access to those weapons?	
5.17	Were there any arms caches located close to your community? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	
5.18	Did your community contribute to the identification of arms caches after the war? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	
5.19	How did your community identify the arms caches?	
5.20	Have you ever heard of the project <i>Transformação das Armas em Enxadas</i> ? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	
5.21	Did your community deliver guns to the project <i>Transformação das Armas em Enxadas</i> ? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	
5.22	Have you ever heard of the project <i>Operação RACHEL</i> ? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	
5.23	Did your community participate in <i>Operação RACHEL</i> ? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	
5.24	If you would find arms caches, who would approach to collect them? <i>1 = TAE 2 = Police 3 = Other (specify)</i>	
5.25	Do people in your community think that violence should be used to solve a dispute? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i>	

5.26	<p>If your community catches a thief, what do people do? <i>1 = we punish the thief and let him/her go; 2 = we bring him/her to the police post; 3 = we bring him/her to the police post but only after punishment; 4 = other (specify)</i></p>	
5.27	<p>If your community catches a rapist, what do people do? <i>1 = we punish the thief and let him/her go; 2 = we bring him/her to the police post; 3 = we bring him/her to the police post but only after punishment; 4 = other (specify)</i></p>	
5.28	<p>If your community catches a murderer, what do people do? <i>1 = we punish the thief and let him/her go; 2 = we bring him/her to the police post; 3 = we bring him/her to the police post but only after punishment; 4 = other (specify)</i></p>	
5.29	<p>Have you been recently victim of a robbery/crime? <i>1 = yes 2 = no</i> <i>If yes, when? (indicate the month and year)</i></p>	